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Abstract  
ART EDUCATION AND THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF AFFECTIVE AND COGNITIVE 
EMPATHY IN EARLY CHILDHOOD 
 
By Luke Meeken, BFA 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Art 
Education at Virginia Commonwealth University.  
 
Virginia Commonwealth University, 2013.  
 
Major Director: Dr. Sara Wilson McKay, Art Education Chair, School of the Arts 
 
 
This study constructs a theoretical framework for exploring the relationship between art 
education practice and the development of empathy in early childhood. In this study, I construct 
a schema for the experience of empathy in kindergarten-aged students, derived from the work of 
Martin Hoffman, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Vittorio Gallese, which acknowledges both the 
affective and cognitive dimensions of the experience of empathy. This schema is examined 
within the context of aesthetic and artistic experience, as distinguished from each other by John 
Dewey. I articulate several ways that art education’s cultivation of subtle aesthetic perception 
may encourage affective empathy, and its cultivation of imaginative cognition may encourage 
cognitive empathy. Suggestions are made for projects and practice in the early childhood 
classroom. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
Background to the Problem 
We live in an increasingly connected and diverse culture where global images are more 
and more accessible to students from across political, cultural, and religious divides (Jeffers, 
2009b). In this cultural and educational milieu, where students encounter and attempt to relate to 
myriad forms of otherness, empathy is a key skill that can “help place [them] outside their own 
comfort zone and within the lifeworld of another person” (Campbell & McDonagh, 2009, p. 
606). 
Despite this apparent need for empathy and place-taking in contemporary culture, 
American college students’ scores on assessments of empathy have been falling since 1990, and 
the rate of decline has increased since 2000 (Konrath, O’Brien, & Hsing, 2011). If we turn our 
gaze from higher education to students’ very earliest school experiences, we find that 
kindergarten teachers “report that their single greatest challenge is that a majority of the children 
lack some or all of the needed social and emotional competencies,” and that teachers feel they 
are less well-equipped to address these challenges than students’ cognitive or academic deficits 
(Whitted, 2011, p. 10). 
In my own experiences teaching early childhood education, I have noticed that preschool 
and kindergarten comprise a critical time when children are very intensely navigating and 
forming conceptions of their relationships. At this age the inchoate affective emotional responses 
of toddlerhood become more resolved as the child gives more complex cognitive attention to 
interpreting these feelings, and the feelings and intentions of others (Hoffman, 1979). 
Sometimes this increased cognitive complexity nonetheless fails to generate an accurate 
understanding of these feelings and intentions. Such was the case of a five-year-old student of 
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mine who reasoned aloud after striking an aggressive classmate that, “We’re supposed to treat 
others how we want to be treated, and he was hitting her, so he wanted me to hit him.”  At other 
times, these experiments in empathy-formation allow a fairly detailed opportunity for place-
taking and exploration of others’ motivations. For instance, a four-and-a-half-year-old student in 
my class, while relating a superhero picture-story he had drawn, made a brief aside to mention, 
regarding the villain: “He’s the bad guy. There aren’t really bad guys. He just really wants the 
money. But he’s not being nice to the people.” 
In my experience, it is not uncommon for an artistic project such as narrative drawing to 
engender feelings and conceptions of empathy. And, indeed, empathy has conceptual 
connections with aesthetic theory in the West. Psychologist Edward Titchener coined the English 
empathy in 1909 as a translation of einfühlung (in-feeling), a concept denoted by Robert Vischer 
in his 1873 aesthetic dissertation on emotional projection, “On the Optical Sense of Form: A 
Contribution to Aesthetics” (Ikonomou & Malgrave, 1994). In this text, Vischer (1873/1994) 
explored how the subject “projects its own bodily form” (p. 92) onto the aesthetic object. This 
projection was to Vischer a somatic, kinesthetic response to an affective, aesthetic experience. 
More recently, Robert Bersson (1982) characterized art education as a “pedagogy of sensuous 
aesthetic response,” which could cultivate this affective empathy by “deepening [the] keyboard 
of feeling” (p. 38). 
The arts have also been linked to a more cognitive conception of empathy, which 
leverages not just feeling, but imaginative thought. Arthur Efland (2004) noted that “[i]t is only 
in the arts where the imagination is encountered and explored in full consciousness – where it 
becomes the object of inquiry” (p. 769). Art education fosters the development of imaginative 
cognition, and Dewey (1934) described imagination as “the chief instrument of the good. It is 
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more or less a commonplace to say that a person’s ideas and treatment of his fellows are 
dependent upon his power to put himself imaginatively in their place” (p. 348). 
This study focuses on how art education can encourage these affective and cognitive 
dimensions of empathetic experience. I give specific attention to the particular cognitive faculties 
of kindergarteners, how the cognitive and affective components of empathy function during this 
developmental stage, and how art education may influence such feeling and thinking in this age 
group. 
Perspective and Theoretical Framework 
My model of empathy draws largely on the developmental research of Martin Hoffman. 
Hoffman (1979) outlined an affective dimension of empathy, which is innate and exists from 
infancy, and a cognitive dimension of empathy, which develops over time and interprets the 
affective empathic response through the child’s constantly evolving cognizance of other people. 
Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) discussion of the child’s relation to the other mentioned 
“transitivism” (p. 135), an absence of division between the affective experience of self and other, 
which is prominent in infancy, but which remains into adulthood and undergirds interpersonal 
relations even after the child becomes aware of a self and an other. Merleau-Ponty characterized 
this twofold relation as one of “introjection” of the other’s experience into the self and 
“projection” of our conceptions into the other (p. 134). Drawing on Merleau-Ponty, I refine 
Hoffman’s schema into a model of empathy in early childhood which includes the internalization 
of the other’s affective state, and the cognitive projection of that affective experience back onto 
the other. This model serves as the framework for my exploration of how art education might 
encourage, or create space for, empathetic experience in early childhood. 
 4 
 
Both the affective and cognitive dimensions of empathy are addressed in this study, as I 
find both are fundamental to understanding how empathy functions, how it is experienced, and 
how it may be encouraged through pedagogy. The affective component is essential to empathy, 
and it is the primary factor that distinguishes it from the wholly cognitive concept of sympathy – 
feeling with, rather than empathy’s feeling in (Fabes, Eisenberg, & Miller, 1990; Feshbach, 1975; 
Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986; Hoffman, 1975, 1979b, 2000; Jeffers, 2009a; Zahn-Waxler & 
Radke-Yarrow, 1990). Norma Feshbach (1975) determined from her studies that while empathic 
experience typically engendered a cognitive understanding of the other, the converse – that social 
understanding would necessarily entail empathetic experience – was not the case, concluding 
that “it is the affective component that gives the empathy construct its unique property” (p. 26). 
Affective empathy precedes cognitive empathy from a developmental perspective, as affective 
experience of the other’s condition begins in infancy while cognitive interpretation of that 
experience develops over the course of childhood (Hoffman, 2000; Merleau-Ponty, 2001/2010; 
Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990). The affective component also precedes the cognitive 
component from a minute situational perspective, as an affective experience of a situation, 
including the situation of the other, is necessarily pre-cognitive (Hoffman, 2000; Merleau-Ponty, 
1964; Gallese, 2003a). 
While the affective dimension is of primary importance to the experience of empathy, 
and some researchers/studies use an exclusively affective definition of empathy (Bryant, 1990; 
Feshbach & Roe, 1968; Stotland, 1969), most of the literature encountered in this study 
acknowledges that cognition also plays a significant role in the experience of empathy (Barnett, 
1990; Eisenberg & Strayer (1990); Feshbach, 1975, 1983;  Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986; 
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Hoffman, 2000; Merleau-Ponty, 1964; Vreeke & Van der Mark, 2003; Zahn-Waxler & Radke-
Yarrow, 1990).
2
 
The cognitive dimension, while not the defining attribute of empathetic experience, is 
nonetheless also essential to understanding empathy and pedagogy related to it. Cognition is 
necessary for all but the most rudimentary forms of empathy (Hoffman, 2000; Merleau-Ponty, 
1964). A purely affective state of empathy, in which affect is indiscriminately shared between 
individuals, characterizes infantile egocentrism (Merleau-Ponty, 1964) moreso than it does 
conceptions of empathy which entail place-taking and understanding of the other’s situation. It is 
via cognition that the subject performs even the fundamental empathetic task of realizing the 
shared affect is not her/his own experience, and locating the affect in the body of the object 
(Hoffman, 2000; Merleau-Ponty, 1964). Because the cognitive component of empathy is more 
intimately connected to the child’s developmental stages (Hoffman, 2000; Feshbach, 1975; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1964), its inclusion in the study facilitates my focus on a specific developmental 
period. Acknowledging the cognitive component of empathy better enables me to examine the 
particular experience and functioning of empathy during early childhood. Including the cognitive 
dimension of empathy in this study also facilitates the discussion of pedagogy with respect to 
empathy, as both the affective and cognitive components afford distinct avenues for encouraging 
empathy in students (Feshbach, Feshbach, Fauvre, & Ballard-Campbell, 1983), providing this 
study more opportunities for suggesting practice. 
                                                 
2
 Norma Feshbach is listed as both an advocate of a purely affective definition of empathy and of an affective-
cognitive conception of empathy because in her earlier work (Feshbach & Roe, 1968), she employed a definition of 
empathy as simply “a vicarious affective response” (p. 133), while in later work (Feshbach, 1975, 1983), she 
outlined a conception of empathy comprised of both affective (affect response) and cognitive (perspective-taking) 
components. The extension of her research into pedagogical practice, the Learning to Care curriculum (Feshbach, 
Feshbach, Fauvre, & Ballard-Campbell, 1983), explicitly emphasizes the development of “affective and cognitive 
skills” (p. 2) to encourage empathy in students. 
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Some theorists advocate a model of empathy with three, rather than two, components, 
including a third dimension concerned with the precipitation of prosocial actions from the 
empathetic experience (Hoffman, 2000; Vreeke & Van der Mark, 2003). Vreeke and Van der 
Mark (2003) asserted that “‘[g]enuine’ empathy includes the urge to provide comfort, to offer 
support, etc.” (p. 185). This “motivational” (Hoffman, 1979b, p. 2) component of empathy is 
beyond the focus of this study, which concentrates on the experience of empathy and how it may 
be encouraged. The question of whether the experience of empathy encourages prosocial, 
altruistic, or moral action (as well as the question of what constitutes a prosocial, altruistic, or 
moral action) will not be addressed in this study. 
My exploration is situated within a social constructivist dialogic frame. Social 
constructivist pedagogy draws on the educational theory of Lev Vygotsky (1926/1992) wherein 
the child constructs her/his cognitive, ethical, and social development through social interactions 
with peers and instructors, rather than receiving external codified systems representing truth. The 
social construction of meaning between people posited within the constructivist paradigm 
reflects Buber’s (1947/1965) notion of dialogue, characterized as a two-way interaction in which 
meaning is found between subject and object. 
This conception of dialogue influenced my formation of a two-way schema of empathy 
involving “introjection” and “projection” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 134), rather than the 
traditional aesthetic conception of empathy as a one-way projection of the self into the 
object/other, wherein “aesthetic enjoyment is objectified self-enjoyment” (Worringer 1908/1963, 
p. 14). This almost solipsistic conception of empathy was criticized by Buber (1947/1965) as an 
“exclusion of one’s own concreteness, the extinguishing of the actual situation of life, the 
absorption in pure aestheticism of the reality in which one participates” (p. 115). The “actual 
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situation of life” Buber mentions above entails a dialogic relationship which includes the lived 
experience of two persons, where “one person, without forfeiting any of the felt reality of his 
activity, at the same time lives through the common event from the standpoint of the other” (p. 
115), feeling the other’s experience without ceding the reality of her/his own experience or 
denying the reality of the other’s. Rather than acknowledging the lived experience of both the 
subject and object of perception, the traditional aesthetic conception encouraged a model of 
empathy where “we build up the other from traits of our own personality[...and t]he person 
beside me, of whom I am conscious, is a doubling and modification of myself” (Lipps, 1903, p. 
106).
3
 My model, which is explained in greater detail in the second chapter, acknowledges the 
reality of the lived experience of the object of empathetic perception, and the significance of that 
experience in inducing the subject’s feelings of empathy.4 
In addition to informing my theoretical framework, this dialogic constructivist 
perspective informs my methodology. Bakhtin’s (1963/1984) articulation of dialogue 
emphasized polyphony, the presence of several distinct, intact voices, over the monologic 
synthesis of those voices into a single, authoritative perspective. In the development of my 
schema and my subsequent exploration of the literature, my aim is to construct meaning from 
those moments when the texts address or interact with each other in unforeseen ways rather than 
synthesize them into a single, monadic model. 
                                                 
3
 Sondern wir bauen sie auf aus Zügen der eigenen Persönlichkeit. Der „Andere" ist die vorgestellte und je nach der 
äufseren Erscheinung und den wahrnehmbaren Lebens äufserungen modifizierte eigene Persönlichkeit, ein 
modifiziertes eigenes Ich. Der Mensch aufser mir, von dem ich ein Bewufstsein habe, ist eine Verdoppelung und 
zugleich eine Modifikation meiner selbst (Lipps, 1903, p. 106). 
4
 My use of the terms “subject” and “object” in this study is intended to maintain clarity when discussing the 
different roles the perceiver – who experiences empathy – and the perceived – who induces empathy – play in my 
schema of empathy. The “object” in this model is also an experiencing subject, and it is entirely possible for two 
individuals empathizing with each other to be subjects and be the objects of each others’ perception. This usage 
derives from the use of these terms in grammar – in the sentence “She perceives the boy,” “the boy” is the object of 
the sentence, and of the verb “perceive,” but rather than designating him as an inanimate object, the term “object” 
articulates his relation to the subject “she” and to the verb “perceive.” 
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 Consequently, I am interested in qualitatively and theoretically coming to an 
understanding about empathy via dialogic interaction with the theories and experience of others, 
rather than epistemically developing a base of data from which to draw quantitative, ‘objective’ 
conclusions about empathy and artmaking in kindergarteners. Doing so places my research 
within a constructivist paradigm. 
Research Question 
 In conducting this study, I intend to find an answer to the question: “How can a theory-
based art education curriculum encourage affective and cognitive empathy in kindergartners?” 
 The problem focuses on kindergarten-aged learners because my personal years of 
experience in early childhood programs provide me a context for subjectively understanding this 
age group, and because this is an age when egocentrism tends to give way to socialization 
(DeVries, Zan, & Hildebrandt, 2002). Children’s artwork also becomes more deliberate and 
figurative in this stage (Matthews, 2004), indicating a period of transition rich in implications for 
study of attitudes towards visual expression and social relationships. 
Purpose of the Study 
This study explores the intersection of theory about the relationship of artmaking to 
empathy with thought regarding the affective and cognitive development of empathy particular 
to children from the ages of 4 to 6. The aim of this research is to create a theoretical space for the 
discussion of empathy in arts education, which could open the way for further experimental 
research to fill this apparent gap in the literature and address a pressing need of contemporary 
early childhood educators (Whitted, 2010). 
Gaps in the Existing Literature 
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While there are a number of studies examining empathy in art pedagogy, I encountered 
no studies that discussed early childhood in this context. Several case studies depicted deliberate, 
empathy-focused arts education practice in late elementary and secondary education (Graham, 
2009; Goldstein & Winner, 2012), at the university level (Campbell & McDonagh, 2009; Jeffers, 
2009a), and in adult professional education (Alvarez, 2010; Robinson, 2007). There has also 
been curricular research in general education for encouraging empathy in younger elementary 
learners (Caselman, 2007; Feshbach et al., 1983). Studies have also been done (typically with 
adult learners) on the relationship between theater education and empathy (Catterall, 2007; 
Goldstein & Winner, 2012; Reilly, Trial, Piver, & Schaff, 2012). However, I specifically found 
no examples of art lessons designed to cultivate empathetic feeling or concepts in very young 
learners. Brown and Sax (2013) recently published results of an experimental study of the effect 
of arts enrichment on the expression and  regulation of emotions in preschoolers, which did 
include empathy as a measure, but their study compared a group engaged in multiple arts 
disciplines (music, dance, and visual arts) to a group engaged in no arts disciplines, and their 
published data only includes general statistics of “positive” and “negative” recorded emotions 
(with empathy included in the former), making it impossible to tease out a relationship 
specifically between empathy and the visual arts. 
The conception of empathy is defined in varying ways and with varying degrees of rigor 
across these studies. Some writers in the field invoke the aesthetic definition of empathy used by 
19
th
-century aestheticians, while others use more contemporary or psychological conceptions of 
empathy, while still others use functional, uncited common-sense definitions of the term. A 
theoretical framework could help art educators place these practices and experiences in 
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meaningful relation to each other and evaluate the different ways – and different degrees of 
success to which – they encourage empathy. 
Background to the Study 
 This study uses a theoretical methodology to examine existing thought and research on 
empathy in artmaking with conceptions of empathetic development and learning in 
kindergarteners to generate recommendations for art instruction that specifically address this age 
group. 
 Jason Wallin (in press) used the work of Deleuze to highlight the affinity between a 
constructivist paradigm and theoretical research, asserting that Deleuze repudiates “the habit of 
framing difference in terms of what already is” (p. 2). Instead, “the images we take for ourselves 
and our world are not fundamental. They too have been created, and hence, might be created 
differently” (p. 2). Wallin’s articulation of Deleuze emphasized an indictment of the use of 
theory to organize and characterize the world according to pre-existing concepts and categories 
(in making this point, Wallin invoked the metaphor of theory as an “automatic interpretation 
machine” (Deleuze, 1973/2004, p. 274)). Rather, Wallin advocated that theoretical investigations 
construct new concepts, categories, and theoretical tools for answering research questions. This 
study subscribes to Wallin’s latter, generative, conception of theoretical methodology, rather 
than the former, interpretive, conception. My constructivist endeavor in my research to create a 
new space for understanding how empathy functions in relation to early childhood art education, 
and to create a new model of empathy to facilitate this understanding, consequently lends itself 
to a theoretical methodology. 
 Wallin (in press) also proposed a shift in thinking, necessary for theoretical research, 
which fundamentally shapes one’s research question and the way it is asked. According to 
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Wallin (in press), theoretical research is best served by the ethical question “What can art do?” 
rather than the interpretive “What does this mean?” (p. 4). My research question explicitly 
probes one aspect of art’s ability to engender empathy, and this focus on ‘ability’ indicates that 
my question is a permutation of the theoretical query “What can art do?” 
 Theoretical research is an ideal methodology for evaluating a corpus of thought and 
research in a particular field, and applying a conceptual framework to it to generate new ideas. 
For instance, in “Six Acts of Miscognition: Implications for Art Education,” Kevin Tavin (2010) 
evaluated a number of prevailing ideas concerning cognition in art education through a Lacanian 
psychoanalytic lens, constructing six acts of “miscognition” (p. 57) which highlight the 
omissions implicit in cognitive theory’s focus on conscious construction of thought. While my 
theoretical lens is not psychoanalytic, I am also evaluating and synthesizing a variety of diverse 
texts and theories regarding empathy. My dialogic constructivist framework, rather than 
uncovering unspoken meanings in my source texts, places them in relation to each other to 
construct meaning from moments of intersection and addressivity among the texts and ideas. By 
drawing connections between the theoretical domains of empathy-in-artmaking and developing-
empathy-in-early-childhood, this study aims to construct the theoretical ground upon which to 
base guiding principles for art education’s fostering of empathetic feeling and cognition in young 
children. 
Significance of the Study 
As discussed above, developing empathy is an important goal in an increasingly 
connected and diverse global culture (Jeffers, 2009b), especially in light of declining U.S. scores 
on “Empathic Concern” and “Perspective Taking” subsets of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(Konrath, O’Brien, & Hsing, 2011). More students are increasingly likely to encounter others, in 
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life and in mediated experiences, from different cultural milieux, and such encounters may pose 
a particular challenge to the experience of empathy (Hoffman, 1979c, 2000; Jeffers, 2009a; 
Momar-Szakacs, Wu, Robles, & Iacoboni, 2007), as empathy tends to have a “similarity bias” 
that could be addressed by empathy education (Hoffman, 2000, p. 294). Focusing on cultivating 
affective and cognitive empathy in young children could also help address the aforementioned 
needs of early childhood educators who identify social and emotional skill levels of their 
incoming students as a significant challenge (Whitted, 2010). Increased empathy in students also 
has an observed correlation with reduced aggression (Strayer & Roberts, 1989). 
What relevance might there be for generating thought about empathy and its 
development, beyond hypothetical instrumental aims at improving students’ prosocial behavior? 
Vittorio Gallese (2003a) contended, from the perspective of neuroscience, that pursuing this line 
of inquiry may illuminate heretofore neglected dimensions of the human mind: 
Why has intersubjectivity progressively gained the centre of the stage? Because more and 
more scholars are experiencing a growing sense of discomfort with respect to the 
heuristic value of accounts of human cognition exclusively focusing on a solipsistic, 
monadic dimension. Intersubjective relations are interesting not only because they 
capture an essential trait of the human mind – its social character – but also, and even 
more importantly, because they provide a greater opportunity to understand how the 
individual mind develops and works (p. 517). 
Hoffman (1973), likewise, saw his focus on empathy and altruism as a complement to a 
preceding history of thought centered on the self, including the “primitive impulses and self-
oriented motives” of psychoanalysis and the “self-fulfillment” of “non-deficiency theorists like 
Maslow” (p. 2). Beyond creating a theoretical space for thought about the socio-emotional needs 
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of students, this project could help create theoretical spaces for understanding how our students 
think, feel, and function interpersonally. 
Limitations of the Research 
 Because my methodology is theoretical rather than experimental or quasi-experimental, 
the schema I put forth is untested. There is no quantitative data to support its use in curriculum 
development or classroom practice, and acquisition of such data is beyond the scope of this 
study. If a curriculum later crystallizes from this research, further, (quasi-)experimental research 
could be done to evaluate the effectiveness of the contained lessons and revise the curriculum, or 
underlying theoretical model, if need be..  
 Another limit of this study is that it does not examine the relationship of empathy to 
prosocial action. Some theorists (Hoffmann, 2000; Vreeke & Van der Mark, 2003) have argued 
that the motivation toward prosocial action is an essential component of “genuine empathy” 
(Vreeke & Van der Mark, 2003, p. 185), and the cultivation of prosocial behavior is an advocacy 
point used by many who argue for empathy in art and general education (e.g. Feshbach, 1983; 
Hoffmann, 2000; Jeffers, 2009a; Stout, 1999; Vreeke & Van der Mark, 2003). However, this 
study is working on the experience of empathy in the child and how art education may encourage 
that experience, not on the precipitation of prosocial action from that experience. While there is 
some experimental data showing a correspondence between empathy and prosocial action (e.g. 
Batson, Batson, Griffitt, Barrientos, Brandt,  Spreugelmeyer, & Bayly, 1989; Fabes, Eisenberg, 
& Miller, 1990; Feshbach, 1975; Strayer & Roberts, 1989), the questions of how empathy may 
elicit prosocial response, and what exactly constitutes a prosocial response, are beyond the focus 
of this study. 
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Another potential limit of this study is that it draws upon several disparate scholarly 
disciplines, including theoretical, philosophical, neuroscientific, and epistemic sources of data 
without wholly synthesizing them into a uniform conceptual space/tool. In this study, I juxtapose 
these disciplines, and highlight their concurrent elements – moments where the same or similar 
phenomena are being approached from different lexical frames – but do not make a case for their 
synthesis or prove unequivocally that they, or the phenomena they discuss, are identical. This 
approach is informed by two factors. One factor is the dialogic theoretical framework discussed 
above, in which aims to preserve the distinct voices informing my exploration (polyphony) rather 
than reign them into a single voice presented as ‘my own’ (monophony). The other factor is the 
ultimately practical aim of my research question, which asks how an art education curriculum 
may encourage empathy. This study aims to address that how by creating a theoretical space for 
developing practice which leverages research from multiple methodologies/disciplines to provide 
multiple avenues of engagement. For instance, while this study does not conclusively 
demonstrate an identity between the activation of kinesthetic mirror neurons (Gallese, 2003b) 
and Theodor Lipps’s (1903) “inner imitation” (p. 98), the inclusion and juxtaposition of those 
two concepts, hailing from different scholarly disciplines, affords educators two different frames 
for the development of practice, as well as the possibility for developing practice that engages 
with both perspectives. The question of whether an activity that aims to elicit affective empathy 
by explicitly activating mirror neurons is more, or less, effective than one that aims to do so by 
encouraging Lipps’s inner imitation could, as noted above, be addressed by a later experimental 
study. 
Such a methodology may be seen as an eclectic approach to theoretical research, one that 
does not wholly engage with the essential truths asserted by different disciplines, or that simply 
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instrumentalizes them. My justification for this approach derives in part from the above-
articulated conception of theoretical research as a method for generating new thought regarding 
practice, rather than a lens for interpreting practice according to a certain truth or system. More 
importantly, this approach derives from an acknowledgment of the dialogic relationship between 
teacher and student. The ‘practical eclecticism’ of appropriating and implementing, through 
pedagogy, several diverse theoretical and methodological approaches is not an instrumentalizing 
trivialization of those approaches. Rather, it is an acknowledgement that the teacher is, 
ultimately, responsible to the student moreso than s/he is to the theorist. The locus of ‘truth’ or 
‘meaning’ – or for determining ‘truth’ or ‘meaning’ – in teaching  is found in the student’s 
response to pedagogy, not in that pedagogy’s rigorous or rigid application of a ‘truth’ or sense of 
‘meaning’ asserted within a specific theoretical framework. An ‘eclectic’ approach to theory 
allows the teacher to be sensitive and responsive to the student’s experience, and to be flexible 
and supple enough to prune or reshape practice – even rigorously theorized practice – if need be. 
Review of the Proposed Study 
 In the following chapter of this study, I review the literature regarding the development 
of empathy in early childhood, and propose a schema of empathy derived from the intersections 
between the texts. Afterward, I take that schema and examine its relationship to artmaking, 
discussing its relation to empathy’s early role as an aesthetic concept and theory linking empathy 
to perception and imagination. Following this, I frame the art-empathy relation within the 
context of art education, and examine suggestions for practice and projects from extant general 
education empathy curricula that may lend themselves to an art education context. I conclude 
with suggestions for further research and a discussion of the potential relevance of this research 
for the field. 
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Ultimately, the goal for this study is the development of theoretical connections between 
empathy-development in art practice and in early childhood, and the generation of a theoretical 
framework for the discussion and encouragement of empathy by art educators. For further 
research, a curriculum derived from this study could be tested in a (quasi-) experimental way. 
Pre- and post- tests derived from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Konrath et al., 2011) and/or 
the Basic Empathy Scale (Albiero, Matricardi, Speltri, & Toso, 2009) could be administered 
before and after a planned intervention. This intervention would be the completion of a unit of 
the developed curriculum in a kindergarten classroom. Students from another classroom could 
also be tested, as a control group. 
 I am also interested in exploring dialogic and empathetic potential in other artforms 
beyond the figurative painting and sculpture focused on in the literature. New media such as 
interactive digital artwork, web-based art, and video art are areas I have explored in my personal 
teaching and artistic practice, and which may have unexplored empathetic potential for young 
learners. Additional empathetic guidelines regarding new media forms could be a fruitful 
extension of the recommendations developed in this study. 
Conclusions 
 In this study I hope to illuminate and explore a new area of the relationship between art 
education and the development of empathy. The recommendations for practice that result from 
this research may provide interested early childhood teachers with a way to engender empathetic 
feeling and thought through artmaking, complementing extant examples that focus on secondary 
and adult education (e.g. Graham, 2009). 
 This research will also help me come to a fuller understanding of the way(s) art education 
can foster empathy in students. Perhaps study in the arts can consciously refine affective 
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empathetic projection in the same way it does affective metaphoric projection (Efland, 2004). A 
more fully-formed understanding of this relationship could inform further refinement of practical 
classroom applications, adapting the resultant curricular principles for other age groups. 
The arts seem particularly well-placed to address the increasing cultural need for 
intersubjectivity and place-taking in the face of an educational climate predicated on individual 
achievement on high-stakes tests (Jeffers, 2009a). Likewise, kindergarten-aged learners are in a 
particular transitional space socio-emotionally and artistically, where the ability of the arts to 
engender empathetic feeling and thinking could be instructive. If it is indeed possible for a child 
to cultivate her/his experience of otherness through the creation and appreciation of art, this 
could encourage even greater appreciation of both the arts and of other people in that child’s life. 
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Chapter 2 - A Model for Empathy in Early Childhood 
Overview of the Model 
 The model of empathy in early childhood I have developed to frame this exploration 
draws largely on developmental psychologist Martin Hoffman’s developmental model of 
empathy, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of the relationship of the child to the other, and 
neuroscientist Vittorio Gallese’s concept of an interpersonal “shared manifold” (2003a, p. 525) 
between subjects which is cultivated by kinesthetic mirror neurons. 
Within the field of art education, Carol Jeffers (2009a) has juxtaposed Merleau-Ponty and 
Gallese within the historical context of aesthetic empathy when developing her university-level 
art instruction. Jeffers made use of the touchpoints between the thinkers’ conceptions of 
intersubjectivity (primarily the emphasis on an embodied response to the perception of the other) 
to frame her class aims, then leveraged the variety of disparate methodological approaches (e.g. 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical phenomenological approach, Gallese’s epistemic neuroscientific 
approach) to generate ideas for projects and pedagogical strategies.
5
 Both Merleau-Ponty (1964) 
and Gallese (with Freedberg, 2007) have also specifically addressed the perception of works of 
art in relation to their models of intersubjectivity. Hoffman’s (1975, 1977, 1979a, 1979b, 1979c, 
2000) research on empathy emphasizes the role the child’s cognitive development plays in the 
experience of empathy throughout the child’s life, which facilitates this study’s focus of the 
particular developmental stage of early childhood. 
Broadly speaking, the defining characteristics of this model are the dual affective and 
cognitive components of the experience of empathy (Hoffman, 2000), and the bidirectional, 
                                                 
5
 Gallese (2003b) himself invoked Merleau-Ponty when presenting his “shared manifold hypothesis.” Gallese used 
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the role gesture and posture play in apprehending the other’s intention to extend his 
own epistemically-derived model of motor-mimickry to a hypothetical model where kinesthetic mirror neurons may 
facilitate the sharing of affect. 
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dialogic nature of the experience of empathy, incorporating both “introjection” and “projection” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 134). 
Summary of Empathy’s Cognitive and Affective Components 
 Hoffman (1979b) defines three components of empathy: affective arousal, cognitive-
transformational, and motivational. The first two components are concerned with the experience 
of empathy, while the third deals with empathy’s capacity to induce prosocial action, and is 
outside the focus of this study. Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow (1990) identify the affective and 
cognitive components as core elements of empathy that persist across various definitions and 
conceptions of the term. The cognitive component “involves apprehending or understanding the 
other person’s experience,” while the affective component involves “a strict or near match of 
another’s emotions” (p. 108). 
 While these two components are distinct, it is their interaction that produces the 
experience of empathy (Barnett, 1990; Eisenberg & Strayer (1990); Feshbach, 1975, 1983;  
Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986; Hoffman, 2000; Merleau-Ponty, 1964; Vreeke & Van der Mark, 
2003; Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990), and to examine one to the exclusion of the other 
would fail to produce a useful model. “[E]mpathy cannot be confined to role taking, or congruent 
or sympathetic emotions. All these psychological components can be present in an empathic 
reaction. There is no reason to leave one factor out, if that particular factor can contribute to the 
way a person responds to the perceived feelings (need or pain) of others” (Vreeke & Van der 
Mark, 2003, p. 179). An exploration of solely empathy’s affective dimension, in which empathy 
was “confined to…congruent or sympathetic emotions,” would neglect the role cognition plays 
in all but the most rudimentary kinds of empathy, limiting the discussion to the immediate and 
unacknowledged experience of the other’s affect which characterizes the indistinction between 
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self and other in infancy (Hoffman, 2000; Merleau-Ponty, 1964). Conversely, a study of only 
empathy’s cognitive dimension, where it is “confined to role-taking,” would neglect the sharing 
of affect that is essential to empathy, and which may be its primary distinguishing factor from 
related concepts like sympathy (Fabes, Eisenberg, & Miller, 1990; Feshbach, 1975; Gruen & 
Mendelsohn, 1986; Hoffman, 1975, 1979b, 2000; Jeffers, 2009a; Zahn-Waxler & Radke-
Yarrow, 1990). Consequently, this study, and the model of empathy I am developing for it, 
incorporates both the affective and cognitive dimensions of empathy rather than focusing on one 
or the other. 
 Affective empathy exists from infancy, and remains fairly constant throughout childhood 
and life (Hoffman, 1979a). This “vicarious affective component…is given increasingly complex 
meaning as the child progresses” through stages of cognitive development, and the child 
develops an increasingly sophisticated cognitive awareness of other people (Hoffman, 1979c, p. 
962). Infants who lack a strong distinction between self and other, for instance, may be 
empathetically aroused, experiencing another’s distress, but would be unable to cognitively 
locate that distress in the other. Conversely, an older child is aware that this arousal is due to a 
stimulus experienced by someone else, and that they themselves aren’t directly experiencing 
distress. “Thus, how people experience empathy depends on the level at which they cognize 
others” (Hoffman, 1979b, p. 5). 
 Hoffman (2000) took this model, in which a consistent affective empathic experience is 
parsed and framed by increasingly sophisticated cognitive processes, and outlined a 
developmental model of empathy drawing on the Piagetian stages of cognitive development 
(with ages and stages adjusted to reflect contemporary research). Hoffman’s stages include: 
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(a) reactive newborn cry, in which infants reflexively imitate the distress states of other infants; 
(b) egocentric empathic distress, in which children respond to another’s distress as though they 
themselves were in distress; (c) quasi-egocentric empathic distress, in which children realize 
the distress is the other’s, not their own, but confuse the other’s inner state with their own; (d) 
veridical empathic distress, in which children come closer to feeling what the other is actually 
feeling because they now realize that the other has inner states independent of their own; and (e) 
empathy for another’s experience beyond the immediate situation, in which children can 
frame another’s distress within a larger timeframe (e.g. chronic misfortune), or empathize with 
remote people or communities. 
 Hoffman (2000) also articulated that, starting with stage (c) in his model, as cognition 
becomes more refined, the child begins to experience what he calls sympathetic as well as 
empathetic stress. He distinguished between the two, describing empathic distress as “a parallel 
response – a more or less exact replication of the victim's actual feelings of distress,” while 
sympathetic distress is “a more reciprocal feeling of concern and a desire to help the victim” 
(Hoffman, 1979b, p. 9). Sometimes, Hoffman’s use of these terms floats, and all cognitively 
mature empathetic experiences are characterized as sympathetic (or all are characterized as 
empathetic), but the above distinction reflects to some degree similar distinctions posited by 
other theorists navigating the distinction between sympathy and empathy, particularly cognitive 
empathy. Generally, empathy is characterized as a congruent response to another’s emotional 
state or condition and the apprehension or understanding of the other’s condition through that 
response, while sympathy is characterized as feelings of sorrow or concern for others (Eisenberg 
& Miller, 1990; Fabes et al., 1990; Gruen & Mendelsohn, 1986; Hoffman, 1975, 1979b, 2000; 
Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990). While sympathetic concern is contingent on the cognitive 
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awareness of the other that facilitates more mature forms of empathy (Hoffman, 1975, 1979b, 
2000), and may even stem from empathetic experience (Hoffman, 1975, 1979b, 2000; Zahn-
Waxler et al., 1990), it is not identical to cognitive empathy, which is invariably induced by a 
congruous empathetic affect response, which serves to locate and frame that response, and which 
doesn’t necessarily induce concern or an inclination to help. 
 The distinction between the affective and cognitive dimensions of empathy not only helps 
in modeling the processes undergirding the experience of empathy, but also affords a model of 
how that process may develop over the child’s lifetime, and – crucially, for this project – how 
that process functions specifically in early childhood. The affective and cognitive components 
are examined in more depth later in this chapter. 
Summary of the Dialogic Nature of the Model 
In his discussion of dialogue, Martin Buber (1947/1965) criticized “the not very 
significant term ‘empathy’” as an “exclusion of one’s own concreteness, the extinguishing of the 
actual situation of life, the absorption in pure aestheticism of the reality in which one 
participates” (p. 115). Buber was criticizing a conception of empathy which articulated the 
phenomenon as a kind of one-way projection of the subject into the object, a conception which, 
to him, denied the independent reality of the other’s felt experience6, and ceded the subject’s 
position as a separate entity with perception and experience independent of the object’s 
(“exclu[ding] one’s own concreteness”).  This articulation of empathy has its antecedents in 
German aesthetic conceptions of the term, which saw it as a kind of one-way projection of the 
subject into the object. Robert Vischer (1873/1994), among the first, if not the first, to delineate 
                                                 
6
  “[T]he actual situation of life” for Buber necessitating an acknowledgement of the lived reality of both subjects, 
without “forfeiting any of the felt reality” (p. 115) of either. 
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the distinct concept of empathy (as “einfühlung”)7, described it as “project[ing] my own life into 
the lifeless form, just as I quite justifiably do with another living person. Only ostensibly do I 
keep my own identity…I am mysteriously transplanted and magically transformed into this 
Other” (p. 104). In Abstraction and Empathy, Wilhelm Worringer (1908/1963) commented that 
this type of “aesthetic enjoyment is objectified self-enjoyment” (p. 14), emphasizing the 
solipsistic nature of such a conception of empathy. Theodor Lipps’s (1909) treatment of 
empathy, which connected the term more overtly to psychology (Depew, 2005; Jeffers, 2009a), 
pushed this further, asserting that in “empathy there exists only one ego [Ich] for me; namely this 
felt or objectified own ego, which is projected into an external object” (Lipps, 1909, p. 231)8, 
positing a model of empathy which had no space for the ego or experience of the perceived 
other. 
Merleau-Ponty (1956/2003) took issue with this conception of empathy, writing:  
This perception of the other, which means that I grasp the body as lived, does not consist 
in transferring onto the body of the other what I otherwise know of my soul. Einfühlung 
is a corporeal operation. The hand of the other that I shake is to be understood on the 
                                                 
7
 While most sources encountered in this study (Depew, 2005; Gallese, 2003b; Ikonomou & Malgrave, 1994; 
Jeffers, 2010; Nowak, 2011; Prigman, 1995) credit Vischer with coining the term einfühlung in 1873, some scholars 
credit Hermann Lotze with coining it in his Geschichte der Aesthetik in Deutschland in 1868 (Depew, 2005) or in 
Mikrokosmus in 1858 (White, 2013). A search of electronic versions of the Lotze texts did not turn up the term. 
Other scholars (Curtis, 2012; Nowak, 2011) credit Herder (1774) for delineating the concept earlier through his use 
of the verb form sich einfühlen within the context of interpreting texts by “feeling into” the historic situation of the 
author. 
The concept also has earlier antecedents under different names. Hume’s (1739) treatment of sympathy is 
similar to the treatment of empathy in this study: a “contagious” (p. 605) affective state that is modulated by being 
intellectually “conceiv’d to belong to another person” (p. 319). Similar ideas go as far back as Aristotle’s pity or 
eleos, which some thinkers (Boal, 1974; Brecht, 1977; Dwyer, 2005; Kearney, 2007; Nissan Cassinis, & Morelli, 
2008; Stocker, 2002), within the context of theatrical performance, have linked to empathy/einfühlung. 
I chose to background this exploration with the context of German aesthetic thought on empathy beginning 
with Vischer and Lipps in part because this is when the term began to focus on the visual arts (Nowak, 2011), rather 
than theater or textual interpretation, and because the einfühlung tradition is frequently, often casually, invoked in art 
education literature discussing empathy (e.g. Bresler, 2013; Hickman, 2013; Jeffers 2009a, 2010; Lanzoni, 2009; 
Smith, Gair, McGee, Valdez, Kirk, 2011; Swanger, 1993; White, 2013) and warrants closer scrutiny. 
8
 In der vollen positiven Einfühlung existiert für mich zunächst nur ein einziges Ich; nämlich dies eingefühlte oder 
objektivierte, in ein äußeres Objekt projizierte eigene Ich (Lipps, 1909, p. 231). 
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mode of the touching-touched hand. I come to sense someone at the end of this hand: to 
perceive the other is to perceive not only that I shake hands, but that he shakes my hand. 
Einfühlung, a quasi-corporal operation, is at first the positing of an esthesiological [e.g. 
sensing] subject. I do not project on the body of the other an “I think,” but I apperceive 
the body as perceiving before apperceiving it as thinking (Merleau-Ponty, 1956/2003, p. 
76). 
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of empathy was not a simple one-way mental (“I think”) projection 
onto the body of the other, but a “corporeal operation” in which that projection was preceded by 
an internalization-by-perception of the other’s bodily state. 
While he was not specifically responding to the one-way conception of empathy in his 
discussion of the child’s relation to the other, Merleau-Ponty (1964) did explicitly call out and 
contradict the assertion of classical psychology
9
 that “the psyche, or the psychic, is what is given 
to only one person...I cannot reach other lives, other thought processes, since by hypothesis they 
are open only to inspection by a single individual: the one who owns them… I seize the other’s 
psyche only indirectly, mediated by its bodily appearances.” (p. 114). His interest in overturning 
the notion of the bounded subject who only experiences others through a sort of analogical 
projection of self-experience makes his model useful in extending the conception of empathy 
(particularly as it relates to art and aesthetics) beyond the level of “objectified self-enjoyment” 
                                                 
9
 Merleau-Ponty frequently criticized “classical psychology” as a broad entity. Though he didn’t identify particular 
thinkers in his criticism of “classical psychology,” Merleau-Ponty used that epithet to broadly identify ideas from 
pre-gestalt psychology such as rigid Cartesian distinctions between subject and object or mind and body (Barclay, 
2000; Nilsen, 2008; Westling, 2012; Rochat & Zahavi, 2011), or faculty theories of mind that enumerate various 
distinct “functions of cognition”(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 99) such as perception, intelligence, or imagination. 
Merleau-Ponty's (1964) discussion of the child's relation to the other asserted that “classical psychology” uncritically 
held a presupposition that there exists a “psyche...which is accessible only to myself and cannot be seen from 
outside” (p. 166), and that this prejudice hampered the ability of “classical psychology” to address self-other 
relations. 
 25 
 
(Worringer, 1908/1963, p.14). Merleau-Ponty (1964) advocated renouncing the prejudices of 
classical psychology, asserting that 
[w]e must abandon the fundamental prejudice according to which the psyche is that 
which is accessible only to myself and cannot be seen from outside. My “psyche” is not a 
series of “states of consciousness” that are rigorously closed in on themselves and 
inaccessible to anyone but me. My consciousness is turned primarily toward the world, 
turned toward things; it is above all a relation to the world. The other’s consciousness as 
well is chiefly a certain way of comporting himself toward the world. (p. 117) 
Merleau-Ponty (1964) described the classical psychological conception as a system of four 
terms: my “psyche,” the “introceptive image” of my own body generated by cenesthesia10, the 
“visual body” of the other, and the hypothetical “psyche” of the other (p. 115). Per Merleau-
Ponty (1964), perception of the other within classical psychology consequently hinges on the self 
analogizing between her/his own body-image and the image of the other’s body to deduce the 
other’s inaccessible “psyche.” This conception becomes problematic when accounting for the 
observed experience the infant has of the other, since the infant typically has “minimal visual 
experience of his body” (Merleau-Ponty, 2001/2010, p. 247) 11 to analogize to the other. 
Merleau-Ponty (1964, 2001/2010) proposed replacing the concept of the interior and inaccessible 
psyche with outwardly visible behavior and replacing the “utterly private sensations” (1964, p. 
117) of cenesthesia with a postural schema that incorporates the outward relation of the body’s 
position and gesture to its environment. to produce a system where the self and other are two 
                                                 
10
 Merleau-Ponty (1964) defines cenesthesia as the mass of sensations that allow the subject to understand the 
present state of her/his own body, and its various parts, organs, and functions.  “Thus my body for me , and 
your body for you, could be reached, and be knowable, by means of a cenesthesic sense” (p. 114)  within the 
classical psychological conception of self as articulated by Merleau-Ponty. 
 
11
 This text, Child Psychology and Pedagogy: The Sorbonne Lectures, was first collected in 2001, and translated 
into English in 2010. It collects Merleau-Ponty’s lectures from 1949-1952. 
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embodied consciousnesses (or “conducts” (1964, p. 118)), visible to each other, “a system in two 
terms: my behavior and the other’s behavior that constitute a totality” (2001/2010, p. 247).  
 Early aesthetic models of empathy (Vischer, 1873/1994, Worringer, 1908/1963) 
emphasized a one-way, monologic conception of empathy. Merleau-Ponty (1964, 2001/2010), 
however, described the relation to the other as a two-way phenomenon, appropriating the 
psychoanalytic terms projection, in which “we think the other, due to our personal experiences,” 
and introjection, in which “we project in us what comes from outside” (2001/2010, p. 259).  In 
the schema I outline in this chapter, I map this model of introjection and projection onto 
Hoffman’s two-part model of empathy, where the sensory experience of the object is affectively 
transmitted into the subject and then projected cognitively by the subject back onto the object. I 
will now explore in more detail these affective and cognitive dimensions of the experience of 
empathy. 
The Affective Dimension of Empathy 
When Maxine Greene (1995) described the ability of a work of art to elicit empathy, she 
said that, “there are images and figures that speak directly to our indignation, to some dimension 
of ourselves where we connect with others. They open our eyes, they stir our flesh, they may 
even move us to try to repair our world” (p. 143). This “stirring of the flesh” – the immediate, 
pre-cognitive, bodily response to our perception of the other – is a fundamental component of the 
experience of empathy. 
In describing their model of empathy, Vreeke and Van der Mark (2003) asserted the 
primacy of the affective experience of empathy. “[T]he first and most basic forms of 
empathy cannot be based on cognitions. Rather, they are built on non-cognitive ways of 
responding, which occur in a relational context. Indeed, young children react to signs of pain and 
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the like well before they have a cognitive understanding of these states” (p. 181). These affective 
reactions form the foundation for empathetic experience. 
 Approaching the concept from a neuroscientific perspective, Vittorio Gallese (2003a) 
described empathy as the capacity to establish “an affective meaningful interpersonal link,” 
which enables understanding of not just emotional states, but of physical experiences in the other 
“such as pain, touch, or tickling” (p. 519). These vicarious experiences are “automatically 
understood by the observer without the necessity of any intervening complex cognitive 
mediation” (Gallese, 2003a, p. 519). This is due to the functioning of kinesthetic mirror neurons, 
which instantaneously fire upon observing the action of the other, simulating it internally
12
, 
meaning that, “the same neural structures that are active during the experience of sensations and 
emotions are also active when the same sensations and emotions are to be detected in others” (p. 
524). The process, as described by Gallese, is pre-cognitive, an “implicit, automatic, and 
unconscious process of embodied simulation [, that] enables the observer to use his/her own 
resources to penetrate the world of the other without the need of explicitly theorizing about it” 
(Gallese, 2003b, p. 174). A number of researchers have connected mirror neurons’ motor 
                                                 
12
 Synthesizing MRI imaging and other experimental data, Carr, Iacoboni, Dubeau, Mazziotta, and Lenzi (2003), 
mapped, on an especially granular level, how this process may occur in the brain: “(i) The superior temporal cortex 
codes an early visual description of the action and sends this information to posterior parietal mirror neurons (this 
privileged flow of information from superior temporal to posterior parietal is supported by the robust anatomical 
connections between superior temporal and posterior parietal cortex). (ii) The posterior parietal cortex codes the 
precise kinesthetic aspect of the movement and sends this information to inferior frontal mirror neurons … (iii) The 
inferior frontal cortex codes the goal of the action (both neurophysiological and imaging data support this role for 
inferior frontal mirror neurons). (iv) Efferent copies of motor plans are sent from parietal and frontal mirror areas 
back to the superior temporal cortex, such that a matching mechanism between the visual description of the 
observed action and the predicted sensory consequences of the planned imitative action can occur. (v) Once the 
visual description of the observed action and the predicted sensory consequences of the planned imitative action are 
matched, imitation can be initiated” (p. 5497). 
Also, Carr et al.’s (2003) imaging studies noted the amygdala, “a critical structure in emotional behaviors 
and in the recognition of facial emotional expressions of others” (p. 5501) is stimulated during this process, 
especially so when the subject is visibly imitating the object’s expression, indicating a connection between the motor 
representation part of the brain and the limbic emotional processing areas (areas which are physically connected by a 
structure called the insula, which may relay information between the two). This may indicate how affective empathy 
can elicit an emotional as well as kinesthetic response.  
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simulation with Lipps’s inner imitation in empathy (Anders, Heinzle, Weiskopf, Ethofer, & 
Haynes, 2011; Carr, et al., 2003; Jeffers, 2009a; Molnar-Szakacs, 2011; Preston & de Waal, 
2002), and Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of perception, gesture, and the postural schema (Gallese, 
2003b; Jeffers, 2009a; Preston & de Waal, 2002). The idea of the other’s conduct being 
apprehended as a motor representation or simulation, a cluster of “motor plans” (Carr et al., 
2003, p. 5497), stimulated by the some of the same motor neurons that activate when I exhibit a 
conduct with my own body echoes Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) discussion of postural schemata, 
where rather than analogizing between a visual self-image and the image of the other, both the 
other and myself are apprehended as “conducts” (p. 118) which can be directly related. In both 
cases, the conduct is apprehended through perception, but is not itself a visual image
13
, affording 
a cross-modal mapping that allows, for example, an infant to map the observed state of the other 
onto their own, despite not having a visual self-image
14
 (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). Thus, visual 
perception is able to elicit kinesthetic affect. 
 Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, and Perry (2009) conducted a study that highlighted the 
connection mirror neurons may have specifically to affective empathy. Using the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index, the researchers evaluated patients with lesions in the inferior frontal gyrus 
                                                 
13
 Corresponding with Carr et al.’s (2003) “motor plans” (p. 5497), Merleau-Ponty (1964) describes the schema 
aroused by perception as “a preparation of a motor activity” (p. 146). 
14
 This “cross-modal mapping” (Gallese, 2003a, p. 518), the ability for visual stimuli to elicit tactile or kinesthetic 
sensations without having to analogize to a prior visual model/experience was highlighted by Gallese in his 
discussion of an experiment wherein infants were able to identify by sight pacifiers they had previously mouthed 
while blindfolded. Vischer (1873/1994), in his own way, articulated the connection between these two modalities in 
his discussion of empathy when he observed that “[t]heir functions are of a kindred nature: touching is a ‘cruder 
scanning at close range’; seeing is a ‘more subtle touching at a distance’” (p. 94). 
Merleau-Ponty (1964) described this synesthetic ability as a component of the child’s affective experience 
of the other, as the child does not distinguish readily between what s/he is experiencing and what s/he is seeing: 
“What is true of his own body, for the child is also true of the other’s body. The child himself feels that he is in the 
other’s body, just as he feels himself to be in his visual image” (p. 134). Merleau-Ponty (1948/1964) also connected 
artistic practice to this multi-modality in his essay on Cezanne, “Cezanne’s Doubts,” noting that “Cezanne does not 
try to use color to suggest the tactile sensations which would give shape and depth. These distinctions between touch 
and sight are unknown. in primordial perception…The lived object is not rediscovered or constructed on the basis of 
the contributions of the senses; rather, it presents itself to us from the start as the center from which these 
contributions radiate. We see the depth, the smoothness, the softness, the hardness of objects” (p. 15). 
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(IFG), which contains the mirror neuron system, and other patients with lesions in the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which handles theory of mind and perspective-taking 
(e.g. components of cognitive empathy). Their findings supported their hypothesis, in that the 
patients with IFG damage exhibited “extremely impaired” affective empathy, while patients with 
vmPFC damage exhibited a “consistent and selective deficit in cognitive empathy” (p. 623). 
Hoffman (1978b) also characterized the affective dimension of empathy as “largely 
involuntary,” and asserted that “[t]he reason why it is hard to avoid empathizing is that very 
simple, almost primitive psychological mechanisms usually underlie it” (Hoffman, 1978b, p. 2). 
Empathy is observable in young children and even in infants, long before they have a viable role-
taking capability (Hoffman, 1979a). Hoffman (1975) noted a study in which two-day-old infants 
responded with their own crying to the sounds of another infant’s cry, yet did not respond as 
strongly to other “noxious” stimuli such as “loud nonhuman sounds including computer-
simulated infant cries” (p. 614). Vreeke and Van de Mark (2003) likewise found in their studies 
that newborns react more strongly to the cries of peers than to other sources of distress, such as 
the taped sound of their own cries, a computer simulation of a cry, or a recording of a chimp 
crying. Merleau-Ponty (1964) also mentioned the phenomenon of “a contagion of cries” (p. 124) 
in a nursery as evidence of an automatic, pre-cognitive experience of the other. Hoffman (1975) 
noted that, “despite its egoistic components,” this kind of empathic distress “shows that we may 
involuntarily and forcefully experience emotional states pertinent to another person’s situation 
rather than to our own” (p. 614). 
Transitivism – “a confusion at the core of a situation that is common to us both” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 120) 
Due to this involuntary affective mechanism, for most of the first year of life, distress 
cues from others elicit a global empathic distress response in the infant (Hoffman, 1975). 
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“Consequently, he must often be unclear as to who is experiencing any distress that he witnesses, 
and he may at times be expected to behave as though what happened to the other person was 
happening to him” (p. 614). (This distress is “global,” in Hoffman’s terms, because it is not 
explicitly bound to a specific person). Merleau-Ponty (1964) called this “indistinction between 
me and the other” (p. 120) transitivism, and placed it at the foundation of all social awareness. 
He described this state as one of “pre-communication, wherein the other’s intentions somehow 
play across my body while my intentions play across his” (p.119). Without any conscious 
communication, and prior to any clear cognitive comprehension on the part of the subject, the 
other’s conduct presents her/his “motor intentions” (p. 118) which are apprehended by the 
subject (and likewise, the subject is the object of the same apprehension on the part of the other). 
Consequently, Merleau-Ponty (1964) argued, the common notion of egocentrism in early 
childhood is actually characterized by a lack of ego, and an excessive permeability with the 
other, a kind of de-centered egocentrism: 
[E]gocentrism is not at all the attitude of a me that expressly grasps itself (as the term 
‘egocentrism’ might lead us to believe). Rather, it is the attitude of a me which is unaware 
of itself and lives as easily in others as it does in itself – but which, being unaware of 
others in their own separateness as well, in truth is no more conscious of them than of 
itself” (p. 119). 
This conception of egocentrism doesn’t see the infant as an entity turned in on itself and alien to 
the experience of others, an entity which only comes to understand others as its cognitive 
capacity develops, allowing her/him to intellectually comprehend others’ perspectives and 
motivations. Rather, this conception of egocentrism posits the child as an entity that is 
fundamentally turned toward and enveloped in the experience of the other, and whose cognitive 
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development (as discussed in the next section of this chapter) is actually instrumental in 
articulating the separation between self and other. Gallese (2003a) likewise mentioned how the 
infant, before it becomes a conscious subject, creates “a primitive ‘self-other space’, a 
paradoxical form of intersubjectivity without subjects. The infant shares this ‘we-centric’ space 
with the other individuals inhabiting his world” (p. 518). 
During the first year of life, when transitivism is most prevalent, Hoffman (2000) noted 
that infants transition from a passive response elicited by affective arousal – the “newborn 
reactive cry” period – to more proactive attempts at self-soothing behavior designed to reduce 
their own stress. However, while the child responds more actively toward the end of their first 
year, the responses of the child are identical for both empathic and personal distress, indicating 
there is still a measure of confusion between the experience of the self and the other (Hoffman, 
2000). Hoffman characterized this period as one of “egocentric empathic distress” (p. 6). 
Mechanisms of Affective Empathy 
 While transitivism is a phenomenon that functions in an immediate, involuntary way, it is 
not necessarily an elementary, irreducible phenomenon. Hoffman (1979b) identified a number of 
more specific modes of affective arousal, and an awareness of these mechanisms is useful for the 
coming chapters examining how artmaking and art instruction may encourage or induce 
experiences of empathy in students. 
 Hoffman (1979b) cited newborn reactive cry as the earliest and most rudimentary 
mechanism of affect arousal. It is the cry of an infant in response to the contagious cry of 
another, and is “vigorous, intense, and hard to distinguish from the spontaneous cry of an infant 
when he is in actual pain” (p. 3). 
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 Hoffman (1979b) also noted conditioning as a mode of affect arousal, which “results 
when one observes distress cues from another person at the same time that one is having a direct 
experience of distress” (p. 3). Such conditioning may occur, for instance, when a parent’s 
affective state is translated into their physical handling of the infant. 
 Mimicry is another mode of affect arousal wherein the observer automatically imitates the 
affective state of the other, creating “kinesthetic cues within the observer that contribute 
(through afferent feedback) to the observer’s understanding and feeling the same emotion.” 
(Hoffman, 1979b, p. 4). This mimicry can also occur as an internal motor simulation of the other 
(Gallese, 2003a, Merleau-Ponty 1964). Vreeke and Van der Mark (2003) discussed an 
experiment in which they observed a 22-month-old reach the conclusion “Mummy hurt” (p. 192) 
after physically imitating a parent who was simulating an injury. 
Kinesthetic Affect 
 The mechanism of motor mimicry is an indication of the role kinesthetic neurons 
(Gallese 2003a) and bodily awareness (Merleau-Ponty 1964) play in the affective experience of 
empathy. Merleau-Ponty (1964) emphasized that the other was experienced as a conduct, rather 
than a psyche, invoking Henri Wallon’s description of one’s experience of the other as “a 
‘postural impregnation’ of my own body by the conducts I witness” (p. 118). 
 There is an “inward formulation of gestures,” in which observing another’s affect 
“arouse[s] in me the preparation of a motor activity related to it” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 146). 
Hoffman (1979a) likewise asserted that “[e]mpathic affect provides inner, kinesthetic cues that 
inform the observer about the affective experience of the model” (p. 5). Gallese (2003a) 
characterized these cues as the firing of kinesthetic mirror neurons, wherein observing a physical 
act or posture activates the same neurons as performing that act or posture, and “[a]ction 
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observation automatically triggers [interior] action simulation” (p. 523). Per Gallese (2003a), this 
embodied simulation forms the basis for all levels of interpersonal interaction, and “enables the 
constitution of a shared and common background of implicit certitudes about ourselves and, 
simultaneously, about others” (p. 521). The projection of these “certitudes” onto the other is a 
function of the cognitive component of empathy, which I examine in the following section. 
 In summary, empathy’s affective dimension is fundamental to the experience of empathy, 
existing from the child’s very earliest developmental stages in the form of transitivism (Merleau-
Ponty, 1964). Affective empathy is an automatic, immediate process by which the state of the 
other is apprehended by perception as a motor conduct/state (Carr et al., 2003; Gallese, 2003a; 
Merleau-Ponty, 1964) and inwardly simulated kinesthetically (Carr et al., 2003; Gallese, 2003a; 
Lipps, 1903; Vischer, 1973/1994), eliciting a congruent affective state in the perceiving subject 
(Fabes et al., 1990; Hoffman, 2000; Vreeke, 2003). This component of the experience of 
empathy functions in concert with a cognitive component (Feshbach, 1975; Hoffman, 2000; 
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009; Strayer & Roberts, 1989; Vreeke, 2003; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1990), 
which I will now examine. 
The Cognitive Dimension of Empathy  
 The above-described affective dimension of empathy, in its pure, transitivist state fails to 
provide the full picture of the experience of empathy, particularly beyond infancy. As the child 
ages and develops a more complex cognition of the other, this cognition parses and directs 
her/his affective empathetic experience, allowing for a more sophisticated awareness of the 
other. 
A major change may therefore be expected when the child begins to discriminate 
between the stimuli from his own body and those from without, acquiring a sense of the 
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other as separate from himself. When confronted with someone in pain, he now knows 
that it is the other and not he who is actually in distress (Hoffman, 1975, p. 614). 
In the second year of life, the beginnings of representational thought and the use of symbols give 
children the ability to begin to imagine and infer others’ perspectives and feelings (Zahn-Waxler 
& Radke-Yarrow, 1990). They better understand that the vicarious distress they experience is in 
the other, and not the self, as result of developing a conception of “person permanence” 
(Hoffman, 1975, p. 611), an awareness of the other’s existence as a separate physical entity, that 
precedes broader object permanence. They cease exhibiting “egocentric empathic distress” and 
begin to demonstrate “quasi-egocentric empathic distress” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 70). At this age, 
the child turns her/his self-soothing reactions outward, where previously they had been 
uniformly applied to the self during both vicarious and directly-experienced stress. For instance, 
Hoffman (1975) described an observation of an infant who had developed the habit of sucking 
his thumb and tugging on his own ear when distressed, but who, after 12 months, when his father 
would make a sad expression, would suck his own thumb and pull on his father’s ear. The child 
at this stage can locate the distress in the other, but cannot clearly distinguish between the self 
and the other’s inner states, administering to the other what the self finds comforting (Hoffman, 
1979b). 
By age three, the child becomes aware that other people’s feelings are independent of the 
child’s, and based on their own reaction to events (Hoffman, 1979b). Hoffman (2000) 
characterized this period as one of “veridical empathic distress” (p. 72), when children are 
cognitively able to refine their empathetic responses based on feedback from the other and the 
environment. Hoffman (1975) cited an instance of a 15-month-old child who, failing to comfort a 
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crying friend with his own teddy bear, went into another room and fetched the friend’s blanket 
(which had been out of his perceptual field) to comfort the friend. 
“Veridical empathy is an important stage because, unlike the preceding stages which are 
short-lived and disappear as they give way to subsequent stages, this stage has all the basic 
elements of mature empathy and continues to grow and develop throughout life” (Hoffman, 
2000, p. 72). Children can begin to engage in elementary role-taking at this stage, and the 
combination of role-playing’s imaginative social hypothesizing with the above-described 
epistemic refinement of social response provides the cognitive toolset with which children will 
scaffold their empathy throughout life. The transition to this stage comes at a critical point, when 
transitivism recedes dramatically and the child’s relation to self and other is radically changed. 
The Crisis at Three: The Mirror Stage 
The increased awareness of self and other that allows for the development of veridical 
empathy stems from the child’s development of a visual image of her/himself and her/his body, 
typically indicated by the child’s recognition of her/his mirror image (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). 
The child’s awareness of others’ specular images in the mirror precedes the child’s 
awareness of her/his own specular image. “[H]e distinguishes much more quickly between the 
other’s specular image and the reality of the other’s body than he does in the case of his own 
body” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 127). Upon seeing two images of, for instance, her/his father, 
the child can readily recognize that one image is seen in the world and the other in the mirror. 
“Of his own body, on the other hand, the mirror image is his only complete visual evidence” (p. 
129). And due to transitivism, the child’s sensing body and observed specular body are not 
distinct. “It is more a matter of a second body in the mirror, a kind of identity at a distance, a 
ubiquity of the body” (Merleau-Ponty, 2001/2010, p. 255). The child eventually (possibly using 
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the specular image of the parent/other as a scaffold) becomes cognitively aware that she/he has 
an exterior aspect, and is visible to others as her/his image is in the mirror. “The other has a view 
of me. The relation with the other has the value of a real structure; it is a system of relations at 
the interior of my experience” (Merleau-Ponty, 2001/2010, p. 255). The child cognitively 
displaces the mirror image from the virtual, visual space it occupies, onto the child’s own 
physical, sensate self (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). 
Through the acquisition of the specular image the child notices that he is visible, for 
himself and for others. The passage from the introceptive me to the visual me, from the 
introceptive me to the “specular I” (as Lacan still says), is the passage from one form or 
state of personality to another (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 136). 
This displacement, this seeing oneself from a perspective outside the self, is critical in the 
formation of what psychoanalysis calls the ego and superego. “The ego, the I, cannot truly 
emerge at the age of three years without doubling itself with an ego in the eyes of the other” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 153). The awareness that there is an external me, “a constructed me, 
that is visible at a distance, an imaginary me” foments the super-ego (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 
137), manifested both as the judgmental gaze of the other and the ego-ideal image of the self 
cultivated to appease that gaze. 
 This sharp distinction between the self and other shatters the permeable transitivism of 
earlier years and radically reshapes the child’s relation to others. This “crisis” understandably 
precipitates a number of characteristics around age three, including an increased desire to do 
things independently or “alone,” an increased self-consciousness, and an annoyance at being 
watched (Merleau-Ponty, 2001/2010, p. 259). 
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 But despite the radical change in relation to the other precipitated by this cognitive 
realization, the transitivism of affective empathy is not completely dissolved. “The crisis at three 
years pushes syncretism farther away rather than suppressing it altogether” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964, p. 154). Affective empathy, and to some degree transitivism, remains throughout life 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964). In his discussion of the “shared manifold” fostered by kinesthetic mirror 
neurons, Gallese (2003a) noted that, “Since the very beginning of our life we…inhabit a shared 
multidimensional interpersonal space, which, I posit, also constitutes a substantial part of our 
social semantic space during adulthood” (p. 519)15. This “indistinction between me and the 
other,” wrote Merleau-Ponty (1964), reappears “in certain situations that for the adult are 
limiting situations but are quite important in his life” (p. 154). An example of such a limiting, but 
important, situation, per Merleau-Ponty, is love, which “is inevitably to enter into an undivided 
situation with another” (p. 155), a situation where comforting, identity-confirming categories 
such as “This is mine, this is yours” (p. 155) are suspended, and where both participants’ 
autonomy and certainty as subjects are rendered more ambiguous. While it is no longer the 
totality of the child’s experience of the other, transitivism remains an important engine of 
empathy into later childhood and adulthood. 
Cognitive Empathy After Age Three 
                                                 
15
 In articulating this “multidimensional interpersonal space,” (p. 519), Gallese (2003a) invoked developmental 
psychologist Andrew Meltzoff’s concept of “a 'supramodal act space', unconstrained by any particular mode of 
interaction, visual or motor” (p. 518), and also emphasized that this “space” was “functionally characterized by 
automatic, unconscious embodied simulation routines” (p. 517). The infant, inhabiting this social/psychological 
space, is consequently able to physically imitate emotional expressions perceived in others, despite not having visual 
access to its own face, or is able to engage in imitative reactive crying (Hoffman, 2000), without a conscious 
awareness of the situation inducing the distress. Like Merleau-Ponty, Gallese argued that this “space,” while present 
and powerful in infancy, remains to an extent throughout later childhood and adulthood. 
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After age three, children’s increasingly concrete awareness of the space between self and 
other, and their imaginative
16
 and epistemic cognitive tools for navigating that space, contribute 
to a continued refinement of veridical empathy. In the preschool years, children can express 
more minutely articulated emotions such as missing one’s parents, rather than simply happiness, 
anger, and sadness. They also begin to realize that the same event can produce different feelings 
in different people. They are aware of the desires of other people, and can use this awareness to 
predict others’ reactions to a situation (Hoffman, 2000, p. 73). 
By age five or six, a few years’ refinement of her/his veridical empathy, the child has 
developed a more complete picture of the difference between self and other, and the emotional 
and experiential independence of the other. Hoffmann (1973) discussed a study by Burns and 
Cavey (1957) in which three-to-six-year-old children were shown pictures where the expression 
of a character was incongruent with the situation (e.g. a boy frowning at his birthday party). 
Five- and six-year olds were able to correctly identify the emotion of the figure, while the three- 
and four-year-olds typically did not perceive the incongruity and judged the pictures in terms of 
how they themselves would feel in the situation. These results indicate that, by kindergarten age, 
children are more likely to recognize the difference in emotional states between self and other 
than they were at the toddler stage. 
This more refined interpretation of emotional stimuli is facilitated by an increase in the 
cognitive capacity for place-taking at this age, a development illustrated in a study by Selman 
(1971) where “subjects were given a simple concept-sorting task and asked to predict what 
choices would be made on a similar task by another child from whom one of the test items had 
                                                 
16
 Rather than the use of the term as a synonym for “creative” or “inventive,” I employ “imaginative” (and related 
terms like “imagination” and “imagine”) in a more strictly denotative way relating specifically to the creation of 
mental imagery. A child “imaginatively” engages in place-taking, for instance, in Piaget’s three mountains exercise 
hen s/he consciously mentally constructs for her/himself an image of what the person on the other side of the table 
sees when looking at the three mountains. 
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been hidden. Nearly all six-year-old subjects could perform the task, while younger subjects did 
poorly” (Hoffman, 1973, p. 18). This increased cognitive complexity also affords the six-year-
old an elementary metacognitive awareness of her/his empathetic response. Hoffman (2000) 
discussed Strayer’s 1993 study in which subjects, after watching filmed vignettes of children in 
distressing situations (e.g. child unjustly punished by parent; disabled child learning to climb 
stairs with a cane; child forcibly separated from his family), were asked if they felt anything and 
why they felt that way. Most seven-year-olds and some five-year-olds said that they felt sad 
because of the feelings or perspective of the child in the film, while most of the five-year-olds 
attributed their own feelings to the events depicted, rather than the emotions of the protagonist. 
Hoffman (2000) posited that “[t]hese findings suggest that before 6 or 7 years, children may 
respond with veridical empathic distress – they feel what is appropriate to the other’s situation – 
but they do not realize that their distressed feeling was caused by the other’s situation, that they 
were empathizing” (p. 74). 
 By late childhood and early adolescence, increased capacity for abstract thought leads to 
an “emerging conception of self and other as continuous persons with separate histories and 
identities,” and a consequent awareness that “others have feelings beyond the immediate 
situation” (Hoffman, 1979b, p. 8). Children’s affective experience of empathic distress may be 
heightened or tempered by its placement within a larger social and temporal context. An 
incidence of a chronic distress may elicit greater empathy with the sufferer’s situation, or an 
awareness that another’s happiness is the result of their benefitting from an unfair or inequitable 
situation may limit one’s empathizing with their joy. Children can eventually be empathically 
aroused by the affective situations of entire groups or classes of abstractly-conceived others (e.g. 
geographically distant populations of people with whom they have never interacted), which may 
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provide the foundation for the adolescent’s developing political consciousness (Hoffman, 1979b; 
Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). 
This level of empathy has antecedents at younger ages. Research indicates that the child 
typically views their gender identity as stable and consistent by ages five and six, and ethnic 
identity as stable by ages six and seven (Ruble & Martin, 1998), which suggests that between 
ages five and eight the child is forming the conception of persons as entities which are consistent 
over time and which have a history, identity, and life beyond the present situation (Hoffman, 
2000). At this younger age, however, the child is less likely to factor this broader life condition 
into their empathetic response, and more likely to center their attention on the more salient 
personal and situational cues of the other’s immediate situation (Hoffman, 2000). Gnepp and 
Gould (1985) conducted a study wherein children from kindergarten to college age were 
provided with a scenario that would elicit an emotion, as well as a contextual narrative that might 
change that emotion (e.g. it is the student’s turn to feed the class gerbil, however the child has 
been bitten by the gerbil in the past). The kindergarten students based their estimations largely on 
the immediate situation, while older students increasingly framed their emotional inferences in a 
broader context. Including an explicit emotional prompt in the question (“Why did Pat feel 
scared?” rather than “How did Pat feel?”) significantly increased the kindergartener’s inclusion 
of contextual information, and indicated that this cognitive empathetic strategy can be scaffolded 
toward during early childhood. 
Mechanisms of Cognitive Empathy 
 In addition to the role of cognition’s general development over time, and the role of this 
development in the increasing sophistication of cognitive empathy, there are also some specific 
modes or mechanisms of cognitive empathy mentioned in the literature. 
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 Hoffman (1979b) described symbolic association (or mediated association) as instances 
where the stimulus for affective response is neither physical nor expressive, but a symbolic 
indication of another’s feelings. “For example, one can respond empathically to someone by 
reading a letter from him, or hearing someone else describe what has happened to him” (p. 5). 
While the parsing of the stimulus is an undeniably cognitive and interpretive process, it induces 
an affective empathic response in the subject. This, consequently, is an indication of how 
cognition can induce an affective, empathic response, how something typically immediate can be 
mediated. Gallese (2003a) located this function in the imagination’s ability to animate 
kinesthetic mirror neurons in the same way as actual visual stimuli. He cited a study in which a 
motor action was presented in full to one population, and was presented, with its “final critical 
part” (p. 522) hidden, to another population. In the latter case, in the absence of an actual visual 
stimulus, the implication and subsequent imagining of the unseen action still activated more than 
half of the same motor neurons. Hoffman (2000) also noted the imagination’s ability to elicit 
empathetic response: 
(a) Cognitive development enables humans to form images, represent people and events, 
and imagine themselves in another’s place; and (b) because represented people and 
events can evoke affect (Fiske, 1982; Hoffman, 1985), victims need not be present for 
empathy to be aroused in observers. Empathy can thus be aroused when observers 
imagine victims: when they read about other’s misfortunes, when they discuss or argue 
about economic or political issues, or even when they make Kohlbergian judgments 
about hypothetical moral dilemmas. (Hoffman, 2000, p. 91) 
The creation of mental imagery, as a function of cognition, has the ability to induce empathy, 
and is in fact critical in some of the more sophisticated forms of empathy described above, such 
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as empathy with large or remote populations. Just as a perceived image can induce the affect 
response that forms the core of this study’s conception of empathy, a mental image can do 
likewise. 
 The imagination allows for another cognitive mode of empathizing identified by 
Hoffman (1979b), role-taking. Role-taking involves a deliberate cognitive act of imagining 
oneself in another’s place. “More specifically, the research suggests that empathic affect is 
especially likely to be generated when we try to imagine how we would feel if the stimuli 
impinging on the other person were impinging on us; rather than, for example, trying to imagine 
directly how the other person feels” (Hoffman, 1979b, p. 5). By imaginatively putting oneself in 
the other’s place, one not only considers intellectually the context and motivation of their 
actions, but also may induce through the creation of mental imagery (or in the case of physical 
role-play, through motor mimicry) affective responses congruent with the object of empathy’s 
affective state. 
Cognition’s Regulatory Role 
 In addition to structuring and extending empathetic experience, Zahn-Waxler & Radke-
Yarrow (1990) discussed cognition’s role in regulating affective empathy in situations where 
“young children of depressed caregivers may experience too much empathy and too many 
feelings of responsibility” (p.119). Children in such situations may vicariously experience 
symptoms of depression such as helplessness repeatedly in early life “as a consequence of 
empathic overinvolvement” (p. 121), which could ultimately hamper social interactions, conflict 
resolution, and the ability to develop more complex empathetic cognition later in life. If the child 
is “somehow able to ‘regulate’ those feelings, [s/he] might succeed in responding prosocially” 
(Vreeke & Van der Mark, 2003, p. 188). If the child is overwhelmed by a strong shared affect 
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and succumbs to it (essentially engaging in a more mature form of “newborn reactive cry”) or 
turns away to stem it, her/his affective empathy with the other could actually hinder her/his 
relation to the other or harm her/his own emotional development. However, if the child is able to 
identify the other’s condition as distinct from her/his own, and locate that trauma within the 
other’s experience, if s/he is able to modulate her/his affective empathy with cognitive self-other 
understanding, then the empathetic experience will have provided a more veridical understanding 
of her/his own and the other’s condition. 
 Similarly, jealousy, an emotional state that can hamper socialization, “is essentially 
confusion between self and other” (Merleau-Ponty, 2001/2010, p. 256) and has its roots in that 
same transitivism that produces affective empathetic experience. The mimicry of the other that 
allows us to internalize the other’s emotional and affective states also allows us to internalize 
their desires, and this now-shared desire manifests as jealousy. Overcoming this adverse outcome 
of identification with the other requires a conscious, cognitive “de-centering” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964, p. 110), a movement of the child mentally out of their own situation and into the larger 
social situation. Merleau-Ponty (1964) cited the example of a child jealous of a newborn sibling, 
who must de-center himself from the situation of youngest child he has occupied and “relativize 
the notions of the youngest and the eldest,” (p. 111) reframing his social position in relation to 
his older and younger siblings rather than only to himself. 
 Acknowledging this regulatory role of cognition will be useful in the following chapters 
discussing art, education, and the encouragement of empathy. An awareness of the potentially 
adverse outcomes of affective identification with the other, and the ways cognitive framing of 
that affective arousal can mitigate those outcomes, may help shape the way art instructors engage 
with the affective and cognitive dimensions of empathy in their students. Both the affective and 
 44 
 
cognitive dimensions of empathy detailed above inform the schema of empathy I am developing 
in my exploration. 
A Schema of the Experience of Empathy in Early Childhood 
 The model of empathetic experience I propose acknowledges Hoffman’s articulation of 
the affective and cognitive dimensions of empathy, as well as Merleau-Ponty’s conception of 
transitivism and the two-way introjection and projection that characterize the relation to the 
other, and the way these concepts are illuminated by neuroscientific and psychological studies 
discussed above. Figure 1, below, is a visual representation of this schema to which I will refer 
as I describe it. 
 
Figure 1 – Diagram of this study’s schema of empathy 
  
An experience of empathy in early childhood begins with an affective experience (labeled 
a, in the above figure) on the part of the other. The affective experience manifests as a behavior 
which is communicated to the self as a visual stimulus (b). This visual stimulus activates the 
kinesthetic mirror neurons producing an embodied simulation (Gallese, 2003a) of the other’s 
affective experience in the subject’s interior postural schema (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). This results 
in an immediate, automatic affective/kinesthetic experience of the other’s state in the self (c). 
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This completes the function of the affective component of empathy, undergirded by a latent 
transitivism that has existed from infancy (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). This affective experience (c) is 
interpreted by cognition (d), and in kindergarten-aged, post-mirror-stage childhood, this 
interpretation includes the projection of this experience back onto the other (e). At this age, there 
is no confusion as to who is experiencing the original affective state and who is experiencing it 
via empathy. 
 As cognition (d) is the aspect of the model most tied to the child’s growth and 
development (Hoffman, 1975), it is important to specify how the cognitive component of 
empathy functions during ages five and six, the ages this study is focusing on. By this point in 
life, the child has completed the “crisis” at the mirror stage, and is aware of the difference 
between self and other (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). She/he is generally aware that the vicarious affect 
experienced through empathy is located in the object and not her/himself. The child has been in 
the veridical stage of empathetic awareness since about age three, and has had two years to refine 
her/his veridical empathy cognitively through social interaction. Consequently, the child is better 
able to acknowledge an individual emotional reaction that differs from her/his own reaction to a 
similar situation, and is less likely to muddle her/his own affective reaction with that of the other 
(Hoffman, 1973, 2000). She/he, however, is not yet consistently able to locate her/his empathic 
distress in the other and distinguish it from her/his own emotional reaction to a stimulus – 
something she/he is scaffolding toward and will be more consistent in doing by age six or seven 
(Strayer, 1993). Children at this age are also working towards more abstract cognition of later 
childhood that affords empathy beyond the immediately observed situation. They are aware that 
certain traits such as gender and species are (generally) consistent over time, and are developing 
the conception that they and others each have a unique identity and history over time (Hoffman, 
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2000), but are not yet able to bring this more abstract background knowledge to bear on 
immediate emotional situations (Gnepp & Gould, 1985). With prompting, however, children at 
this age can make the connections necessary to frame their empathic response within a broader 
context (Gnepp & Gould, 1985). 
 Empathy involves on one hand, affectively, the “fundamental correspondence between 
perception and motility” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 146), and on the other, cognitively, the 
“imagination [which] is what, above all, makes empathy possible” (Greene, 1995, p. 6). How can 
empathy’s relationship with perception and imaginative cognition illustrate connections between 
artmaking, art instruction and empathy? This is what I explore in the following chapters. 
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Chapter 3 – Art and Empathy 
Introduction  
 The model of empathy developed and employed in this study has two components: the 
affective experience of the other’s state and the cognitive parsing and projection of that state 
back onto the other. Both of these dimensions are rooted in the subject’s lived perceptual 
experience: the affective arousal is incited by the perceived experience of the object, and the 
cognitive projection is imaginatively mapped onto the perceived situation of the object. In this 
chapter, I argue that art’s working relation to perception and imagination can help facilitate the 
sensitivities that allow one to be aware of and responsive to the experience of the other. To frame 
this discussion, I will begin with a reflection on the historic relationship between empathy and 
aesthetics. While my schema of empathy is not identical to the aesthetic empathy described by 
19
th
-century aestheticians, and has more in common with later, psychological, uses of the term, I 
do feel my model acknowledges the aesthetic roots of the term, and it is useful to examine 
empathy’s migration from a mostly aesthetic concept to a mostly interpersonal one. 
A Brief History of Empathy as an Aesthetic Concept 
The concept of empathy, and possibly its very denotation as a concept distinct from 
sympathy, has an intimate connection with the discussion of aesthetics, particularly German 
aesthetics of the late 19
th
 century, where empathy was characterized as a one-way in-feeling 
(einfühlung) or projection of the subject’s bodily experience into an object. Logician and 
aesthetician Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1856/1885) articulated in his Mikrokosmos that “there is no 
shape so coy
17
 that our fancy cannot sympathetically [mitlebend] enter into it” (p. 584), and this 
                                                 
17
 The word translated here as coy, the German spröde¸can also be translated as brittle, or of a woman, demure, 
highlighting a problematic gendered dimension of the aesthetic language which describes empathy as a one-way 
infiltration of the object by the subject. This is an entailment which I feel is mitigated by the more dialogic two-way 
model of empathy described in the previous chapter. 
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phenomenon was later encapsulated in the term einfühlung, coined by Robert Vischer
18
 
(1873/1994) in his “On the Optical Sense of Form: A Contribution to Aesthetics.” 
This identification between empathetic and aesthetic projection did not go unquestioned, 
and the relation between the two concepts was problematized by later thinkers. Wilhelm 
Worringer (1908/1963), in his Empathy and Abstraction, described Vischer’s one-way 
empathetic projection as a model in which “aesthetic enjoyment is objectified self-enjoyment” 
(p. 14), and criticized Vischer’s model as being “Europo-centric” (p. 99). Worringer described 
two models of aesthetic experience, one characterized by empathy and related to artwork 
containing life-like forms, and the other characterized by abstraction and related to indigenous 
and modern artforms through which the viewer escaped the world of natural forms, rather than 
embracing and being subsumed in it. 
The loosening of the relation between aesthetic experience and the concept of empathy 
was perhaps further facilitated by the increased prominence of those artforms characterized by 
Worringer as abstract, which encouraged other modes of engagement, as well as by the increased 
use of the term einfühlung in the domains of psychology and social science, which made other 
people, rather than material forms, the object of empathy (Depew, 2005). “Originally the 
paradigmatic cases of empathy were inanimate objects, including ‘expressive’ works of art. Once 
psychotherapy and ethics captured the term, however, persons became paradigmatic” (Depew, 
2005, p. 102). Empathy underwent a shift in meaning, from acknowledging that the feelings we 
feel about others are actually our own projected feelings, to referring to our ability to identify 
with others by getting in contact with their feelings, and in making this shift empathy became 
less associated with aesthetics (Depew, 2005). 
                                                 
18
 See note 7 on p. 23 for a discussion of other possible attributions for the first use of einfühlung. 
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By the early 20
th
 century in the English-speaking world, the word empathy (coined by 
Edward Titchener in 1909 as a translation of einfühlung) was being used in translations of Freud, 
while the aesthetic writings of the Earl of Listowel (1952) retained the original German word, 
describing Vischer et al. as “the Einfühlung School” (p. 26), perhaps indicating that the 
psychological concept of empathy was detaching itself from the aesthetic concept of einfühlung 
(Depew, 2005). 
By the second half of the 20
th
 century, particularly in Germany, there was greater 
skepticism regarding the connection between aesthetics and the cultivation of meaningful 
interpersonal relation. Habermas (1983), in his Modernity – An Incomplete Project, commented 
on the relationship between the emergence of “terroristic activities and…tendencies to 
aestheticize politics” (p. 12), linking aesthetics with a rigid dogmatism or “reified everyday 
praxis” (p. 11). Habermas presented aesthetic values as constructed impositions upon lived 
experience from without, rather than values grounded in lived sensory and social experience. 
Within the world of fine art in particular, Habermas asserted that the various movements 
“attempt[ing] to blow up the autarkical [e.g. enclosed, self-sufficient] sphere of art and to force a 
reconciliation of art and life…those attempts to level art and life, fiction and praxis, appearance 
and reality to one plane; have proved themselves to be sort of nonsense experiments (p. 11),” 
which highlight, rather than dissolve, the “irreconcilable nature of the aesthetic and the social 
worlds (p. 10).” However, Habermas also noted that the cure for a rigid, ‘aestheticized’ way of 
living was “by creating unconstrained interaction of the cognitive with the moral-practical and 
the aesthetic-expressive elements” (p. 12), indicating a role for aesthetic sensitivity and 
expression in cultivating a supple, non-dogmatic social reality. He elaborated one manner in 
which aesthetic experience could accomplish this: 
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[O]ne way that an aesthetic experience which is not framed around the experts’ critical 
judgments of taste can have its significance altered: as soon as such an experience is used 
to illuminate a life-historical situation and is related to life problems, it enters into a 
language game which is no longer that of the aesthetic critic. The aesthetic experience 
then not only renews the interpretation of our needs in whose light we perceive the world. 
It permeates as well our cognitive significations and our normative expectations and 
changes the manner in which all these moments refer to one another (Habermas, 1983, p. 
13). 
The aesthetic experience, when grounded in lived experience, and when allowing the 
unconstrained interaction of the cognitive, affective, and expressive domains, can take a person 
beyond her/his own subjective sphere (“our needs in whose light we perceive the world”), and 
fundamentally destabilize her/his way of encountering the world and the “normative 
expectations” that frame it. As Dewey (1934) noted, when art is directly related to one’s 
experience, “[i]nstead of fleeing from experience to a metaphysical realm, the material of 
experiences is so rendered that it becomes the pregnant matter of a new experience…the sense 
we now have for essential characteristics of persons and objects is very largely the result of art” 
(p. 294). The aesthetic need not be an imposition of the abstract or ideal upon experience, but 
may derive directly from the lived affective experience of the self and other and inform one’s 
cognitive conceptions of oneself and other people. 
In this chapter, I discuss how a model of empathy which extends beyond a one-way 
aesthetic conception, and which acknowledges the affective and cognitive dimensions of the 
relation to the other, relates to the experience of art and artmaking. I also explore how 
experiences with art might diminish those habituated modes of thinking which impede empathy. 
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I first outline two primary rigidities, perceptual and psychological rigidity, and how they are 
related to each other, before discussing how perceptual rigidity impedes affective empathy, and 
how aesthetic experience could possibly mitigate perceptual rigidity. Afterward, I examine how 
psychological rigidity can hamper cognitive empathy, and how imaginative cognition could help 
counteract this rigidity. 
The Link Between Perceptual Rigidity and Psychological Rigidity 
In his discussion of the connection between visual perception and one’s relation toward 
the other, Merleau-Ponty (1964, 2001/2010) identified the phenomena of perceptual rigidity and 
psychological rigidity, and examined the correspondence between the two. Psychological rigidity 
is characterized as  
the attitude of the subject who replies to any question with black-and white answers; who 
gives replies that are curt and lacking in any shading; who also is generally ill disposed, 
when examining an object or a person, to recognize in them any clashing traits; and who 
continually tries, in his remarks, to arrive at a simple, categorical, and summary view 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 101). 
Per Merleau-Ponty (1964), rigid subjects tend to be, on closer examination, much more 
conflicted internally than their professed attitudes indicate. When questioned about family, for 
instance, they tend to respond using categorical affirmations without nuance or ambiguity – their 
family is either ideal, or abhorrent. These observations tend to focus on the inessential and 
external, avoiding more detailed examination or understanding of others or their internal states. 
However, blanket affirmations typically mask a “lively aggression” toward their family (p. 102). 
This rigidity is not congenital, but learned, acquired through their social relations with family. 
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The parents of rigid subjects are typically authoritarian. “More often than not, such persons are 
traditionalists” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 101). 
 Perceptual rigidity is, likewise, an aversion to ambiguity, but with respect to visual 
imagery. When presented with an ambiguous image, perceptually rigid subjects tend to discern 
and cleave to a singular interpretation that is clear, without nuance, and often conditioned by 
stereotype (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). 
 In discussing the nature of perceptual and psychological rigidity Merleau-Ponty (1964) 
cited Melanie Klein’s distinction between ambiguity and ambivalence as a key concept. 
Ambivalence is the state of the rigid subject, and “consists in having two alternative images of 
the same object, the same person, without making any effort to connect them or to notice that in 
reality they relate to the same object and the same person” (p. 103). Conversely, ambiguity 
allows for complexity and contradiction, is characterized as a “phenomenon of maturity” (p. 
103), and can admit, for instance, that the same being can be at once kind and generous as well 
as annoying and imperfect. A tolerance for ambiguity on the part of the subject, an ability to 
respond to a seemingly self-contradictory sensation or idea without reducing or splintering it into 
stereotyped categories, directly opposes the perceptual and psychological rigidities described 
above. 
 Psychological rigidity, with its attendant ambivalence, can shape the subject’s perception 
of others, resulting in perceptual rigidity (Merleau-Ponty, 1964). Merleau-Ponty (1964) invoked 
Freudian terms to describe how psychological rigidity shapes the perception of the other, noting 
that rigidity functions as a reaction formation, producing a defense mechanism wherein the 
subject projects the denied part of themselves onto the other. This process also may explain the 
tendency of the rigid subject to employ stereotypes or to adhere to traditional concepts. Merleau-
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Ponty (1964) noted that “[f]or example, men who, by virtue of the established myths…do not 
want to be weak and sensitive and want to be self-sufficient, decisive, and energetic, project on 
women exactly those personality traits they do not themselves want to have” (p. 104). 
Consequently, a rigid male subject may fail to elicit a veridical affective empathetic response to a 
woman’s experience, due to perceiving in the woman sensations and emotions derived from this 
defensive projection, rather than from the actual immediate experience of the woman. While it 
seems clear that psychological rigidity has a relation to social perception, what is perhaps 
surprising is the relation it has to more immediate visual perception, as evidenced in Merleau-
Ponty’s discussion of a study in perception conducted by Else Frenkel-Brunswik. 
 Frenkel-Brunswik’s (1949) study involved 1500 American schoolchildren between 11 
and 16 years old, 120 of whom were identified as especially psychologically rigid. Their rigidity 
was determined by an interview early in the study wherein the subjects were asked to evaluate 
phrases such as “Teachers should tell children what to do and not try to find out what the 
children want,” “Girls should learn only things that are useful around the house,” and “There is 
only one right way to do anything” (Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949, p. 123). The students were then 
subjected to several perception tests. In one case, students were shown a series of cards wherein 
an image of a dog was gradually transformed into an image of a cat. In students who had scored 
high on the psychological rigidity assessment “[t]here was greater reluctance to give up the 
original object about which one had felt relatively certain and a tendency not to see what did not 
harmonize with the first set as well as a shying away from transitional solutions” (Frenkel-
Brunswik, 1949, p. 128). Other similar tests, with cards depicting gradual changes in hue, 
numerals changing into other numerals, and numerals “emerging from indistinctness” (p. 129), 
had the same results, as did a visual-spatial problem-solving task involving finding a shorter path 
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on a map after a longer route was first established. Evidence repeatedly indicated that the 
presence of psychological rigidity tended to correspond with the presence of perceptual rigidity. 
 This study does not, however, imply a cause-effect link between perceptual 
rigidity/suppleness
19
 and psychological rigidity/suppleness. Merleau-Ponty (2001/2010) 
remarked on the results of Frenkel-Brunswik’s study that 
[i]n reality, the question of causality is devoid of sense. How can we say if our manner of 
living socially shapes our perceptions or the other way around? It would be necessary to 
isolate the two phenomena, which is impossible. Mme Frenkel-Brunswik has only 
searched for close correlations that exist between the two phenomena; she showed that 
they are two moments of a single whole: the individual’s situation in a certain historical 
environment (p. 244). 
While the subject’s perception is connected to the subject’s relation to the other, there is no 
unidirectional causal connection between the two. Consequently, this study is not an examination 
of how to improve artistic perception by encouraging prosocial behavior, or vice-versa. Rather, I 
address both perceptual and psychological rigidity, how they hamper the affective and cognitive 
dimensions of empathy, respectively, and how experiences with art (and in the next chapter how 
art education) may address these rigidities and provide the affective and cognitive suppleness to 
facilitate the experience of empathy as defined in this study. 
 Dewey (1934) distinguished between the terms aesthetic and artistic is his discussion of 
art and experience, defining the former as referring to the act of perception and enjoyment, and 
the latter as referring to the act of imaginative production. This dual conception of the artistic 
                                                 
19
 I characterize the opposite of perceptual and psychological rigidity as suppleness, a term which I feel expresses 
both the flexibility and sensitivity that characterize the sort of non-prescriptive relation to the other necessitated by 
my affective-cognitive schema of empathy. Sensitivity is necessary to perceive and take in the other’s experience, 
and flexibility is necessary to parse ambiguous experiences and formulate a cognitive response that is germane to the 
particular immediate situation and not simply an instance of an internalized preconception or habit. 
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experience, along with Greene’s (1995) assertion that art education combats rigidity through “the 
stimulation of imagination and perception” (p. 138) provides the frame for this chapter’s 
exploration of art’s interaction with the two domains of empathy in my schema. Aesthetic 
perception will be discussed in relation to empathy’s affective dimension and perceptual rigidity, 
while imaginative production will be discussed in relation to the cognitive dimension of empathy 
and psychological rigidity. 
Aesthetics, Perception and Affective Empathy 
 Dewey (1934) asserted that aesthetic experience provides a challenge to systematic 
thought, to modes of being where “[t]he inertia of habit overrides adaptation of the meaning of 
the here and now” (p. 272). Rather than serving as a retreat from lived experience and awareness 
or responsiveness to others, aesthetic sensitivity can ground the subject in lived experience and 
mitigate habits or preconceptions that color perception and characterize rigidity. 
 Within the context of this study’s framework for empathy, the affective dimension – the 
perception and vicarious experience of the state of the other – is contingent on the subject’s 
sensitive perception of the other, and this affective experience forms the basis for the more 
complex cognitive forms of empathy. This lucid perception is related to the aesthetic experience 
(Dewey, 1934), and a cultivation of this sensitivity can function to reduce perceptual rigidity. 
As Dewey (1934) noted, “the esthetic is no intruder in experience from without, whether 
by way of idle luxury or transcendent ideality, but … it is the clarified and intensified 
development of traits that belong to every normally complete experience” (p. 46). Attention to 
the aesthetic need not entail a retreat to an internal Rococo flower garden or rarefied field of 
perfect Platonic forms – on the contrary, it entails a heightened sensitivity to one’s affective 
experience and a consequent heightened awareness of the affective experience of the other. This 
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sensitivity toward, and perception of, the experience of the other, encourages the affect arousal 
that comprises the affective dimension of this study’s model of empathy. While the affective, 
kinesthetic experience of the other’s state is involuntary and immediately triggered by perception 
of the other’s state, if the subject, as a consequence of her/his perceptual rigidity, does not 
perceive the other’s state then this affect arousal may not be triggered. In this section I explore 
the ways aesthetic experience and perception could address the problem of perceptual rigidity. 
Aesthetic Suppleness and Perceptual Rigidity 
 The experience of art can present us with new aesthetic sensations that destabilize our 
habits of perception and increase aesthetic sensitivity. Dewey (1934) noted that “the excursions 
of art create new sensitivities that in time absorb what was alien and naturalize it within direct 
experience” (p. 282). These experiences can be as overt as a film detailing the challenges faced 
by a person with a physical handicap, as subtle as an unconventional gesture articulating an 
intermediate emotion in a figure, or as abstract as a striking and unusual color juxtaposition. In 
its own way, each affords an opportunity to broaden one’s affective palette, and erode those 
internalized systems which have “superimposed some preconceived idea upon experience instead 
of encouraging or even allowing esthetic experience to tell its own tale” (Dewey, 1934, p. 275). 
By mitigating the effect of such rigid systems, aesthetic experience may help make the subject 
more sensitive to immediate affective experiences, including those perceived in the object which 
elicit an affective empathetic response. 
 Figures 2, 3, and 4, below articulate how the concept of rigidity maps onto the schema of 
empathy outlined in the previous chapter. In Figure 2, the subject, outfitted with a perceiving eye 
(with apologies to Philip Guston), has its perception either expanded or atrophied by diverse or 
anemic aesthetic experiences, respectively.  
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Figure 2 – The broadening of perception through abundant aesthetic experience 
 
           
Figure 3 – The schema with sensitive perception                   Figure 4 – The schema with narrowed perception 
In Figure 3, the subject with supple perception is able to take in a fuller picture of the 
affective experience of the other, and this introjection produces a veridical affect reaction that is 
projected back on the object. In Figure 4, the subject with rigid perception has a reduced, less 
veridical, affect reaction to the other’s experience. This anemic reaction is supplemented or 
supplanted by habituated thought patterns, which then color the cognitive projection made onto 
the object. 
Transitivism and the Experience of the Image 
 More specifically germane to the visual arts and to my schema of empathy is Merleau-
Ponty’s (1964, 2001/2010) discussion of the mirror image’s role in the “third-year crisis” (1964, 
p. 153) and the ongoing role images play with respect to the subject’s transitivism (or affective 
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empathy, in my schema). Before the mirror stage occurs, the child identifies with the mirror 
image in the same way s/he identifies with others, through the “syncretic sociability” of 
transitivism (Merleau-Ponty, 2001/2010, p. 253), an undifferentiated I that permeates both 
subject and object, and  muddles any distinction between the two. This “gives the specular image 
the value not of a simple reflection, of an ‘image’ in the proper sense, but rather of a ‘double’ of 
oneself – this belief never totally disappears” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 138). As transitivism is 
retained and provides the affective foundation for later complex cognitive modes of empathy 
throughout life, this experience of the image as a kind of incarnation persists and is found in 
other images (such as a person’s shadow, a photograph, or a created image) encountered later in 
life (Merleau-Ponty, 2001/2010). If an image can elicit the same kind of affective feeling-into 
that the experience of the other does, then perhaps the aesthetic experience of the image can 
foster the affective experience of empathy. And perhaps affording opportunities to encounter 
diverse and ambiguous imagery can mitigate rigidity and cultivate more subtle and sensitive 
perception, allowing for a more refined and responsive affective empathy. 
 This experience of the image, because it is a function of transitivism, is an affective, 
unreflective experience, contrasting with the reflective, cognitive consideration of the image 
where it is reduced to an appearance with which the subject has no relation (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964). This affective consideration “which we use in immediate life when we do not 
reflect…gives us the image as something which solicits our belief...[T]he image in the mirror,  
even for the adult, when considered in direct unreflective experience, is not simply a physical 
phenomenon: it is mysteriously inhabited by me; it is something of myself” (p. 132). The 
sensitive immediate perception – the aesthetic perception – of the image reactivates the syncretic 
sociability of transitivism, the affective component of empathy. 
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 It is because this experience of the image is affective that it retains the ability to elicit 
transitivism throughout life. If the understanding of the image as an image which occurs during 
the crisis at three were purely intellectual, it would manifest as a categorical proposition that 
would be applied to all images encountered by the child for the rest of her or his life (Merleau-
Ponty, 1964). This is not the case, and “the work of ‘reduction [of the image to just an image],’ 
even when done by the child in respect to the image in the mirror, never ends with a general 
result, such as a concept. The child must do the work all over again in respect to other analogous 
phenomena – shadows, for example” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 133). The affective nature of 
experience of the image allows it to retain its transitive quality to some extent even after the 
mirror stage, providing an opportunity for immediate, affective response rather than a rote, rigid 
cognitive reiteration of a finalized, categorizing “work of ‘reduction’” (p. 133) completed at an 
earlier date. 
 Merleau-Ponty (1964, 2001/2010) linked this haunted, inhabited quality of the image 
with the significance, and sometimes condemnation, of images in some cultures. For example, 
the tradition in Abrahamic religions where “one is forbidden to make images of men because this 
is similar to deliberately creating other human beings– and this is not man’s proper function” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 132). An obverse cultural response to the same phenomenon can be 
found in iconodulic cultures, such as Eastern Orthodoxy, where religious images are felt to 
evince the real presence of religious figures. Merleau-Ponty (1964) asserted that such beliefs 
could only be understood if images function as more than simply signs distinct from the depicted 
subject, but as an incarnation of the represented person. To illustrate how this experience of the 
image is not relegated only to cultures in which the phenomenon has religious significance 
attached to it, Merleau-Ponty noted that “[e]ven an adult will hesitate to step on an image or 
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photograph; if he does, it will be with aggressive intent. Thus not only is the consciousness of the 
image slow in developing and subject to relapses, but even for the adult the image is never a 
simple reflection of the model; it is, rather, its ‘quasi-presence’” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 132). 
As infantile ‘decentered’ egocentrism invests the image with human value through transitivism, 
perhaps the human value that images retain into adulthood can elicit or reignite this kind of 
affective decentering and empathy, providing observers with the opportunity to feel themselves 
into a variety of objects in a variety of situations, cultivating the supple perceptiveness that 
facilitates empathic affect arousal. 
Perspective and Supple Perception in Works of Art 
 Merleau-Ponty (2001/2010) discussed the inherently subjective nature of perspective in 
artwork, and the ability of perspective systems to shape perception of experience. Traditional 
Renaissance perspective, despite its intention of representing objective reality, is shown to be 
simply one possible subjective artistic perspective when juxtaposed with Greek, Byzantine, 
Medieval, or other imagery with other strategies for organizing visual experience (Merleau-
Ponty neglected to mention myriad non-Western strategies of representation which also serve as 
a counterpoint to Renaissance perspective). The idea that a single perspective with a vanishing 
point can represent objective reality is shown to itself be a subjective position
20
. “[P]erspective is 
not natural, it is biased. Many systems are possible... [however, o]nce acquired, this image of the 
world seems natural” (Merleau-Ponty, 2001/2010, p. 438). Consequently, the quality and 
diversity of one’s aesthetic experience may contribute to the suppleness – or the rigidity – of 
one’s affective perception. 
                                                 
20
  In his essay on Cézanne, “Cézanne’s Doubt,” Merleau-Ponty (1948/1964) commented that “By remaining 
faithful to the phenomena in his investigations of perspective, Cezanne discovered what recent psychologists have 
come to formulate: the lived perspective, that which we actually perceive, is not a geometric or photographic one” 
(p. 14). 
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 The young child who has not yet acquired the “natural” image of the world dictated by 
her/his visual culture is less perceptually rigid, and more responsive to alternative methods of 
perception and representation than in later childhood and adulthood. Merleau-Ponty (1964) 
commented on the capacity of the young child to interact with modern paintings when such 
images were still a fairly novel form of representation: 
It is altogether startling to see certain children much more apt to understand this drawing 
or that painting by Picasso than the adults around them...To the extent that the child is a 
stranger to this cultural tradition and has not yet received the training that will integrate 
him within it, he recognizes with great freedom in a number of traits what the painter 
meant to show. If you like, the child’s thought processes are general from the start and at 
the same time are very individual. They are expressive thought processes that get to the 
essentials by means of a concrete corporeal recovery [reprise] of objects and conducts as 
given (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 150). 
This understanding demonstrates a suppleness in perception that can be either strengthened or 
ossified by artistic experience. By engaging expressively with the work, the child is not troubled 
by the ambiguity of the presented space or the lack of a single dominant point of perspective. 
Even if the child has passed through the mirror stage, and possesses an “I,” s/he does not 
necessarily expect every image encountered to reflect the perspective of an “I,” and spatially 
ambiguous paintings may provide an opportunity for decentering, for feeling into one or many 
alternate perspectives. This way of seeing or making “could not be understood as simple 
breakdowns on the road to ‘visual realism’ and…instead, these processes testif[y] to the presence 
in the child of a relation with things and with the sensible very different from the one that is 
expressed in the perspective projection of drawing in the classic style” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, 
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p.98). While this flexibility of perception is fairly endemic to young children and their artwork, it 
does not indicate a specific naïve developmental stage on the road to more concrete “objective” 
forms of representation. Just as transitivism remains a part of the experience of the other 
throughout life as more complex cognitive faculties are acquired, this flexible affect can remain a 
part of the child’s artistic experience and vocabulary even as the child accretes more varied and 
complex strategies of representation. Affording young students aesthetic experiences with a 
variety of strategies for representing perception and space may encourage the persistence of this 
suppleness of perception into later life. 
Above, I have explored some of the ways in which aesthetic experiences with works of 
art may help encourage a perceptual suppleness that is conducive to affective empathy. These 
include the ways figurative images engage the transitivism that undergirds my schema of 
empathy, and the way ambiguous imagery – such as that containing multiple or unconventional 
perspectives – mitigates habituated modes of seeing that may preclude the sensitive perception of 
the other which induces affective empathy. In the following section of this chapter I shift my 
focus to the cognitive dimension of empathy, and its relation to the imaginative forms of 
cognition that shape strategies of representation. 
Imagination, Image-Making, and Cognitive Empathy 
 If the cultivation of flexible, supple perception encourages affective empathy, it is the 
development of flexible, supple modes of imaginative cognition – including metaphor – which 
encourage the cognitive, projective dimension of empathy. Maxine Greene asserted that the 
imagination is, above all, what makes empathy possible. “Imagination may be a new way of 
decentering ourselves, of breaking out of the confinements of privatism and self-regard into a 
space where we can come face to face with others and call out, ‘Here we are’” (Greene, 1995, 
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p.31). Just as the cognitive dimension of empathy frames and extends the affective experience of 
empathy, Dewey (1934) averred that imaginative artistic engagement serves to “concentrate and 
enlarge an immediate experience” (p. 273). Artmaking, as “the impregnation of sensuous 
material with imaginative values” (p. 293), takes this imaginative extension of lived experience, 
and invests it back in the sensuous and social world, much in the same way that cognitive 
empathy takes an imaginative extension of empathetic affect arousal, and projects it back onto 
the object. With this conception of art as a parabola having both its origin and endpoint rooted in 
lived experience, it is unsurprising that Dewey (1934) saw Platonic aesthetics – where art is a 
tangent leading the viewer away from the physical to the essential – as “a ghostly metaphysics 
irrelevant to actual esthetic experience” (p. 293). 
 The role of imagination in the empathetic experience of the other is corroborated by 
Strayer and Roberts’s (1989) experimental study of the relation between imaginative thinking 
and empathy in 6-year-olds. The children in the study first completed a questionnaire assessing 
their own empathy. Their parents and teachers also completed two questionnaires, one reflecting 
their own level of empathy, and the other reflecting their perception of the child’s empathy. The 
children participated in activities to assess role-taking, structured and free imagination, ego 
resilience, verbal ability, and prosocial behaviors. The study found that the children’s 
performance on the structured imagination and creativity assessment, and their teachers’ 
assessment of their imaginative skills in class, corresponded with both empathy and role-taking, 
and that empathy and role-taking corresponded with each other (Strayer & Roberts, 1989). 
 With respect to rigidity, Fesmire (1999) noted that “[i]magination is the only means we 
have for transforming old habits in order to meet novel demands” (p. 541). If psychological 
rigidity is impairing the subject’s cognitive empathy by conforming to easy habits and prejudices 
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rather than responding to the immediate situation, imaginative thinking can help open up the 
cognitive space for new conceptions not beholden to pre-held notions. One manifestation of such 
un-habituated, imaginative cognition is the formulation of new metaphors in lieu of prevailing 
cultural clichés, an action that does not simply generate new turns of phrase, but constructs new 
ways of thinking about and organizing experiences (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), including one’s 
vicarious experience of the other. 
Metaphor as Imaginative Cognition, and Empathy 
 Johnson (1993) asserted that “metaphor lies at the heart of our imaginative moral 
rationality, without which we would be doomed to habitual acts” (Johnson, 1993, p. 33). Per 
Johnson, the conceptual frames in terms of which we understand concrete social situations 
typically involve systems of metaphor. For instance, what Johnson (1993) terms the “Social 
Accounting Metaphor” (p. 42) is often used to articulate – and to comprehend – the rights and 
duties one person has with respect to another, and an individual can be described as being 
indebted to another, or an individual can give someone credit for fulfilling a duty, etc. What is 
important to remember about Johnson’s (and George Lakoff’s) conception of metaphor is that it 
not only dictates figures of speech, but also is the mechanism by which we structure our thinking 
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Metaphors connect an abstract target domain to an experiential source 
domain, providing a conceptual frame for understanding the abstract (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). 
Someone beholden to the social accounting metaphor will necessarily have a different way of 
thinking about interpersonal relations than someone who does not conceive of the obligation of 
one person to another as a sum on a balance sheet. 
 By changing our metaphoric frame and replacing one metaphorical system for another, 
we can change our ways of thinking about our world and experience (Johnson, 1993). And since 
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more complex forms of empathy require our cognitive faculties to frame and parse our affective 
experience (Hoffman, 2000), the metaphoric constructs that shape our cognition can affect our 
capacity to empathize. The ability to generate new metaphoric connections can stem 
psychological rigidity by providing the suppleness and flexibility to break away from pre-
established metaphoric frames dictating our relationship to experience and to others. In his 
discussion of Lakoff and Johnson’s metaphoric model, Arthur Efland (2004) placed this ability 
to imaginatively examine and construct new metaphoric frames squarely in the arts: 
Let me emphasize this point once more – that the arts are places where the constructions 
of the imagination can and should become the principle object of study, where it is 
necessary to understand that the visual image or verbal expression are not literal facts but 
embodiments of meanings to be taken in some other light. It is only in the arts where the 
imagination is encountered and explored in full consciousness – where it becomes the 
object of inquiry (Efland, 2004, p.769). 
In much the same way that imaginative artmaking can facilitate the cognitive projection of the 
subject’s affective experience into an object21, this imaginative cognition can also foster new 
connections of the subject’s affective, experiential “source domains” onto abstract “target 
domains,” forming new metaphors and creating new models for framing experience (including 
the experience of the other). 
Imagination Inducing Affective Experience 
Apart from forming metaphors that may facilitate cognitive empathy, imaginative 
cognition can also arouse empathetic experience by simulating an affective experience. Hoffman 
(1979b) discussed the concept of symbolic (or mediated) association, where affective response is 
triggered not by a direct sensory experience but by a cognitive image of an experience, typically 
                                                 
21
 See “Imagination and Role-Taking in Art,” below 
 66 
 
elicited by some symbolic indication of another’s feelings (e.g. a sad letter from a friend). Were 
this a completely abstract relation to the object, without the affect arousal, this phenomenon 
would reflect sympathy, rather than empathy – but as indicated by Gallese’s (2003a) 
experimental work, mental imagery induces the same internal motor simulation as perceptual 
imagery, and that internal motor simulation is the neurological basis for the affective component 
of empathy in this study’s model. 
 Brent Wilson (1976) illustrated how this kinesthetic power of the cognitive image can be 
manifested in artmaking by citing examples from the autobiographical writings of author Julian 
Green: 
[H]e became what he drew, so much so that he said he drew with such a “savage joy” that 
he bit his tongue ([Green,] 1967, p. 33). There can be little doubt that the expectation of 
excitement and emotional involvement stemming from the structural and meaning 
qualities of children’s drawings is a strong motive for their involvement (Wilson, p. 52). 
In the descriptions cited by Wilson, image-making functions in a way similar to dramatic play, 
the child projecting her/himself into her/his image, circumventing social and physical limits to 
imaginatively explore – and elicit – new kinds of experience. Even when their work does not 
have narrative content, it is common to observe children empathetically grimacing, frowning, or 
gritting their teeth when fully invested in a drawing – as well as to observe similar reflexive 
facial expressions in adult portrait artists or illustrators as they work. Through the imaginative 
creation of mental and material imagery, artists can intentionally, cognitively, induce the 
typically involuntary affective experience of empathy. 
Imagination and Role-Taking in Art-Making 
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Hoffman (2000) identified role-taking as a higher-order cognitive mode of empathy, in 
which the subject uses their imagination to place themselves in the object’s position and to 
experience the object’s affective state from within its own situation. Role-taking also facilitates 
empathizing with a person who is not physically present (Hoffman, 2000). The ability to imagine 
“expands the importance of empathic morality beyond the face-to-face encounters of children,” 
(p. 8) allowing a more complex empathizing with a wider population of people. 
 As discussed above, Julian Green’s accounts of “feeling into” (Wilson, 1976, p. 33) his 
childhood drawings and identifying with the content of them, functioned as a form of dramatic 
play, encouraging role-taking such that “he became what he drew” (p. 52). In my teaching 
experience, children’s dramatic play typically follows an (admittedly loose) narrative thread, and 
those artworks which reflect a similar sort of place-taking tend to be narrative in structure as 
well. 
Conclusion 
 The experience of empathy as characterized in this study has two components: the 
affective experience of the other’s state and the cognitive parsing and projection of that state 
back onto the other. Both ends of this experience of empathy are rooted in the immediate, lived 
experience of the subject, as the affective arousal comes directly from the object’s lived 
experience, and the cognitive projection is mapped onto the perceived situation of the object. 
Consequently, rigidities of perception and thought that impede sensitive and subtle awareness of 
the other can hamper empathetic response, encouraging canned, prescriptive responses that don’t 
acknowledge the immediate situation or experience of the other. 
 Aesthetic experience can cultivate the kind of perceptual nuance which can preclude the 
perceptual rigidity that hinders affective empathy, and artistic experience can engender a 
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suppleness of thought which can loosen the psychological rigidity that hampers cognitive 
empathy. Art’s working relation to perception and imagination can help facilitate the sensitivities 
that allow one to be aware of and responsive to the experience of the other. 
 How can this relation be explored in the art education classroom? How have art educators 
implemented these connections in practice, and in what ways can they be further implemented? 
In the next chapter, I explore art education’s relation to the experience and encouragement of 
empathy. 
  
 69 
 
Chapter 4 – Art Education and Empathy 
 
Art Education and Psychological and Perceptual Rigidity 
 Just as Dewey (1934) recognized the distinction between artistic and aesthetic 
experience, and lamented “the absence of a term designating the two processes taken together,” 
Maxine Greene (1995) hoped for a pedagogy that afforded both of those types of experience, 
with “one pedagogy feeding into the other: the pedagogy that empowers students to create 
informing the pedagogy that empowers them to attend (and, perhaps, to appreciate) and vice 
versa” (p. 138). When I discuss “art education” in this study, I likewise envision it as a pedagogy 
that includes aesthetic and artistic experiences. I frame art education’s relationship to empathy 
through its potential for “the stimulation of imagination and perception” (p. 138, emphasis 
added), its provision of aesthetic experiences broadening and sensitizing perception and fostering 
affective empathy, and its provision of artmaking experiences exercising those imaginative 
faculties which “above all, make empathy possible” (p. 3). 
 For Greene (1995), such a pedagogy entailed combatting the kind of habituated, 
standardized thought and perception characterized by Frenkel-Brunswik (1949) as rigid. Greene 
(1995) cited Arendt: 
Provoked by the spectacle of the Nazi Adolf Eichmann, Arendt broached the same theme 
in a warning against “cliches, stock phrases, [and] adherence to conventional, 
standardized codes of expression and conduct [which have] the socially recognized 
function of protecting us against reality, that is, against the claim on our thinking 
attention that all events and facts make by virtue of their existence”...Instead, she was 
asking for a way of seeking clarity and authenticity in the face of thoughtlessness (p. 
126). 
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By encouraging students toward a sensitive aesthetic perception and reflective imaginative 
cognition, art education can help address the problems of banal affect or clichéd thought that 
characterize perceptual and psychological rigidity. In relation specifically to this exploration, I 
posit that art education could, by mitigating these rigidities, afford a supple affective awareness 
of the condition of others and consequently a more veridical affective empathy, as well as a more 
vivid capacity for imaginative projection and consequently a more robust cognitive empathy.  
Perception and Affective Empathy in Art Education 
“Art,” Dewey (1934, p. 104) noted, “throws off the covers that hide the expressiveness of 
experienced things.” In Art as Experience, he (1934) distinguished between perception and 
recognition. Perception is the seeing act as an aesthetic experience, which “involves the 
cooperation of motor elements” and “is emotionally pervaded throughout” (p. 53). Recognition, 
on the other hand, is “perception arrested,” in which “we fall back, as upon a stereotype, upon 
some previously formed scheme” (p. 52). For Dewey, the pursuit of aesthetic experience, and for 
Greene the aim of aesthetic education, was the displacement of rigid recognition by supple 
perception. This sentiment is echoed in Shklovsky’s (1917/1998) observation that art combats 
“habitualization” by “remov[ing] objects from the automatism of perception” and “impart[ing] 
the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known” (p. 18). Merleau-Ponty 
(1948/1964), in his discussion of Cézanne, noted that “[t]he painter who conceptualizes and 
seeks the expression first misses the mystery – renewed every time we look at someone – of a 
person’s appearing in nature” (p. 16), contrasting the artist who approaches their model aiming to 
recognize a preconceived expression with the artist – in this case Cézanne – whose supple 
perception acknowledges the immediate, “renewed” expression of the other in this particular 
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encounter
22
. The cultivation of sensitive, immediate perception through the experience of art 
could be significant in fostering affective empathy. While I do not posit that aesthetic education 
can explicitly train students to have affective empathy – not being a cognitive function, the 
affective response cannot be overtly instructed, in my estimation – aesthetic experiences in 
education may engender the sensitivities that make affective empathy possible, and  mitigate the 
rigidities that impede this dimension of empathy
23
. 
Addressing the affective dimension of empathy may be of particular importance when 
trying to encourage empathy in early childhood. Norma Feshbach (1975) conducted a study of 
first grade students which indicated that their cognitive awareness of others’ emotional states, 
which was generally high, did not correspond to high incidences of empathy with (i.e. vicarious 
experience of) those emotional states, concluding that “while the cognitive dimension of 
empathy is important, it is the affective component that gives the empathy construct its unique 
property” (p. 26). Simply understanding, or being instructed regarding, the state of the other will 
not induce the vicarious affect arousal characteristic of empathy. This conclusion is corroborated 
by Craig and Weinstein’s (1965) research in conditioning vicarious affect arousal (in admittedly 
older subjects). Craig and Weinstein observed that while there was no difference in vicarious 
affect between groups that knew an actor would be shocked and groups that did not know, there 
was a significantly higher incidence of vicarious affect arousal in groups that saw the actor get 
shocked more frequently. Image, experience, and observation aroused the subjects’ affect more 
                                                 
22
 Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of Cézanne also echoed Shklovsky’s notions of habituation and estrangement more 
overtly when he commented that “Cézanne’s painting suspends these habits of thought [taking as granted man-made 
objects and spaces] and reveals the base of inhuman nature upon which man has installed himself. This is why 
Cezanne's people are strange, as if viewed by a creature of another species” (p. 16). Per Merleau-Ponty, Cézanne’s 
artistic practice serves as an example of an artist using his practice to eschew enculturated modes of perceiving and 
conceiving in order to encounter, and portray, others in a supple, immediate, way. 
23
 With that said, one of the goals of this chapter is to articulate ways this theory may be applied in art education 
practice, and as a consequence some of the language used may seem instrumental or causal. When I do imply a 
cause-effect relation, especially with respect to affective empathy, I have tried to choose language which specifies 
that a given art encounter is affording or activating an experience rather than teaching a skill. 
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readily than language, cognition, or inference. Perhaps an art education that affords opportunities 
for meaningful aesthetic experiences and the cultivation of sensitive affective perception would 
consequently be more likely to elicit empathetic experiences, and encourage learners to be 
receptive toward affective empathetic experiences beyond the classroom. 
Exposure to Breadth and Subtlety of Emotional Affect in Art Education  
“What part can education play in deepening this keyboard of feeling?” asked Robert 
Bersson (1982, p. 38) “Art educators, with their long experience in fostering that subjective, 
intuitive mode of activity known as creativity, should be the first to accept the possibility of a 
pedagogy of sensuous aesthetic response.” And “deepening this keyboard of feeling,” should art 
educators accept the charge of providing students with a rich repertoire of affective and 
emotional experiences through art, is a pursuit that several researchers posit as a prerequisite for 
affective empathy. 
Norma Feshbach (1975), for instance, noted that “the affective response to the experience 
of others is not instinctive but depends, at least in part, upon the child’s having previously 
experienced that affect” (p. 26). Fabes, Eisenberg, and Miller (1990) observed a correlation 
between parents who were restrictive of their child’s range of emotional expression and their 
children’s lower scores on scales of empathy. Martin Hoffman (1979b) observed that 18-month-
olds who have seen adults cry are more likely to exhibit empathetic affect response to others, as 
are preschool students who cry frequently, proposing that “we should expect that if the child is 
allowed the normal run of distress experiences, instead of being shielded from them, this should 
extend his empathic range” (p. 12). Later, Hoffman (2000) articulated this notion within his 
larger theoretical framework of empathy, noting that prior experience with an emotion would 
facilitate the empathetic experience of that emotion through direct (affective) association, 
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mediated/symbolic association (affective, but induced by cognitive parsing of a symbolic trigger 
such as a sad letter), and role-taking (cognitive). “It follows that socialization that allows 
children to experience a variety of emotions rather than protecting them from these emotions 
(hothouse flower) will increase the likelihood of children’s being able to empathize with 
different emotions: It will expand their empathic range” (p. 288). 
A child with a deeper “keyboard” of feeling would be more likely to acknowledge subtle 
or ambiguous affect, particularly if they have encountered/experienced it before, rather than 
simply recognize it (in the Deweyan sense of the term) as one of a handful of clichéd emotions 
drawn from an anemic repertoire (“happy” “sad” and “angry” seemed to be the mainstays on pre-
printed materials during my preschool teaching experience). While affect response is 
involuntary, Hoffman (2000) articulated how an involuntary affect response contingent on 
perception can still be mitigated by perceptual rigidity or fostered by considered pedagogy: “if 
one pays attention to the victim one should respond automatically with empathic distress. Since 
paying attention is to an extent under voluntary control, it follows that socialization experiences 
that direct the child’s attention to the inner states of others should contribute to empathy 
development” (p. 289). While the affective empathic response is itself involuntary, that does not 
mean that every child is automatically aware of her/his peers’ emotions or perceives them, 
possibly precluding an affective response. One way that art educators may sensitize students to 
the affective experience of others may be to introduce them to a variety of affects and emotions 
through works of art and artistic responses to affecting images/experiences. 
Feshbach, Feshbach, Fauvre, and Ballard-Campbell, (1983), in their Learning to Care 
curriculum, described a number of pedagogical activities that emphasize the development of 
sensitive affect response. Some of these projects are visual arts projects, and some are 
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discussions centered around imagery or performances. While not all of the art projects described 
be Feshbach et al. may have the formal, expressive, or conceptual rigor of many projects 
conceived by arts specialists, they still may serve as exemplars of ways artistic exploration could 
mitigate perceptual and psychological rigidity and foster empathy. 
For example, with respect to developing a deep repertoire of emotional experiences, 
Feshbach et al. (1983) described a simple activity wherein students identify the affect of figures 
in photographs from their faces and posture. “If opinions differ, discuss why. For each 
photograph, the children should offer several alternatives as to what might have caused the 
character to feel the emotion pictured” (p. 12). Within the art classroom, discussions encouraging 
this kind of sensitivity could be part of any introductory presentation featuring a figurative artist. 
For instance, a lesson on black and white photography may begin with a discussion of a selection 
of Diane Arbus photographs where the subjects have particularly expressive, perhaps ambiguous, 
expressions or postures, providing an opportunity for students to empathize with figures from a 
different time, in different attire and from a variety of different social situations than the students 
themselves. 
Admittedly, these sorts of seeing, labeling, and discussing activities have a significant 
cognitive component to them, as the affect response to the image is subjected to reflection and 
discussion in the classroom. As Hoffman (2000) noted, however, the involuntary affective 
empathic response to the other’s condition is contingent on the subject being attentive to and 
aware of the other’s condition. This attentiveness is “to an extent under voluntary control” (p. 
289), and conscious discussion to raise this awareness can perhaps allow for greater sensitivity. 
The interactions between the affective and cognitive dimensions of empathy are not simple, and 
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the two are distinguished in my schema not to ensure that each is treated utterly separately, but to 
ensure that each receives an appropriate amount of attention. 
Activities to cultivate sensitivity to more subtle emotional affect can be found in 
Feshbach et al.’s (1983) Learning to Care curriculum and Tonia Caselman’s (2007) Teaching 
Children Empathy. Both texts feature activities which focus on discerning different levels of 
emotional intensity, with Feshbach et al. (1983) describing a game where students draw from 
two decks of word cards to make a phrase such as “very / angry” or “a little / embarrassed,” and 
then describe a situation fitting that emotion, after which her/his peers attempt to guess the cards’ 
phrase. Caselman (2007) described a similar activity, where students must express the emotion 
bodily rather than describe a situation, escalating their expression from “a little [x]” to 
“extremely [x]”. There are several ways an early childhood art project could address similar fine 
gradations of feeling. One obvious project would be to add a shade of complexity to the typical 
“colors and emotions” lesson, moving beyond the simple recognition (in the Deweyan sense) of 
clichéd happy/sad/angry emotional states, and the appending of those states to the saturated 
primary tempera colors of the typical elementary-school paintbox. By incorporating tints of 
colors, adding white to lessen intensity, students could articulate, and in doing so try to perceive, 
more subtle gradations of emotion in their lived experience. After personally associating a color 
and emotion, students could then mix tints of that color to render scenes from their life (or 
someone else’s) where that feeling was at different levels of intensity. 
There are several ways art teachers can provide young students with the opportunity to 
experience and empathize with a variety of affective states. Art history and art practice present a 
variety of expressive works and acts that can introduce students to a wider range, and a more 
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subtle gradation, of emotions than young students may encounter in their other media 
experiences. 
Exercising the Postural Schema in Art Education 
 In addition to exposing students to a variety of emotional affects, aesthetic experience can 
also induce physical affective empathetic experiences. Building upon Gallese’s (2003a) work 
with mirror neurons, Freedberg and Gallese (2007) examined how static images can induce “the 
empathetic understanding of the emotions of represented others or, most strikingly…a sense of 
inward imitation of the observed actions of others in pictures and sculptures” (p. 197). Citing 
prior experimental research on internal motor simulations ignited by observed images and 
actions, Freedberg and Gallese extended those findings to the experience of art objects, 
suggesting how Michelangelo’s Prisoners can induce a “felt activation” (p. 197) in the viewer of 
the muscles tensed in the sculpture, or how Goya’s Disasters of War can elicit a physical 
response “in precisely those parts of the body that are threatened, pressured, constrained or 
destabilized” (p. 197) in the work. Freedberg and Gallese also drew upon research showing how 
images of manipulable objects induce an associated interior motor simulation, indicating that a 
work need not contain a figure to induce an embodied affect reaction, and that “even a still-life 
can be ‘animated’ by the embodied simulation it evokes in the observer’s brain” (p. 201). They 
then went further, citing prior research on the inner motor responses to marks and letters to 
suggest that non-representational work, such as the expressive splatters of Pollock and the sliced 
canvases of Fontana, could induce an inner motor simulation, empathetically experiencing the 
gesture of the artist. 
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 Carol Jeffers (2010) drew a great deal upon Freedberg and Gallese in her discussions of 
her students’ experiences with works of art. Describing a student’s reported encounter with a 
Cézanne still life, Jeffers noted that  
Molly’s still life was “really a moving life” as she experienced it through some 
remarkable motor simulations—those she embodied when imagining a hand reaching into 
the painting to grasp the signifying apple, Cézanne’s hand at work on the canvas, and her 
own hand working to copy his composition (p. 35). 
Molly’s encounter with the Cézanne painting illustrates Freedberg and Gallese’s (2007) 
observations that both manipulable objects in the image, and the visible marks used to make it, 
can elicit a motor response in the viewer. While master studies are of debatable value, and not 
terribly appropriate for early childhood, Jeffers’s (2010) discussion of Molly’s recreation of the 
Cézanne illustrates how such studies may teach not through slavish recreation of the art object, 
but through recreation of the artist’s postural schema, as deduced from subtle perception of the 
art object. Jeffers (2009a) also discussed the involuntary mirrored facial expressions made by 
students when encountering pieces, such as Bill Viola’s video installation Six Heads, which 
prominently features expressive faces. This observation echoes Hoffman’s (2000) mention of the 
“special role” (p. 194) he felt visual media, including film and video, could play in cultivating 
empathy, as viewers/students “mimic the facial expressions of actors from other cultures and 
through feedback experience the actors’ emotions in various situations.” However, most of 
Jeffers’s (2009a, 2009b, 2010) discussion of the role empathy plays in her art classroom 
emphasized reported empathy between students discussing their responses to works of art, rather 
than the affective empathetic response induced in students by their experience of the artwork. 
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 Sarah Alvarez (2010), the Director of Teacher Programs at the Art Institute of Chicago, 
was more overt in her discussion of the role embodied experiences with works of art play in the 
Art Institute’s Art and the Workplace program. The Art and the Workplace program was 
developed in 2005, under Alvarez’s oversight, at the request of the professional development 
staff of the University of Chicago Hospitals to design an art experience to help strengthen the 
emotional sensitivity, literacy, and resiliency of new nurses in training. Empathy is identified as 
a key aptitude in the Art and the Workplace program, and Alvarez (2010) noted that sensitivity to 
the expressive potential of pose and gesture, developed by using artwork to “tap into [students’] 
kinesthetic intelligence” (p. 273), was one means by which the program cultivates that aptitude. 
The Art and the Workplace program frequently, for instance, has activities where students adopt 
the pose or gesture of a figurative piece – and in the case of pieces with multiple figures, where 
multiple students pose in a tableau – and describe how they feel while recreating the 
scene/posture. By literally embodying the perceived expression and gesture of the figure(s) in the 
art object, students can map their postural schema (Merleau-Ponty, 1964) onto the figure’s, and 
induce an affective empathetic experience, a practice which, Alvarez (2010) argued, makes them 
more mindful of others’ nonverbal expressions of affect. 
 Feshbach et al. (1983) described a few activities that may provide these kinds of 
embodied, affective experiences. One activity described involves taking photographs of each 
student showing a facial expression and using these photos as a visual aid for recognizing 
emotions. Such an activity could be elaborated in myriad ways. Perhaps students could take an 
expressive photographic self-portrait in which they are bodily responding to an emotional prompt 
(e.g. “How would you feel if it was your birthday and no one came to your party?”). Or, to 
borrow from Alvarez’s (2010) activity with the Art and the Workplace program, perhaps students 
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could each “act out” a part in a photographic tableau recreating  (or reinventing) an expressive 
art-historical image. A follow-up might involve students then planning and executing an original, 
contemporary scene which includes the same expression or emotion. 
 Caselman (2007) described an activity where students watch a segment of a film or video 
without sound, and attempt to recognize the affective state of the characters based solely on their 
posture and expression. A simple inversion of this activity could turn it into a productive arts 
exercise that challenges students to express emotional and affective states bodily without 
dialogue. Students could collaborate with the instructor to plan and shoot a “silent film,” 
requiring them to embody and express the feelings of the characters in the scenario without 
dialogue. If the students work in multiple smaller groups, a class screening could provide the 
opportunity for discussion and recognition of affective states in peers’ projects.  
Engaging Visual Culture and the “Exhaustion of Empathy” 
 Visual culture education often emphasizes the cultivation of critical acuity (Freedman & 
Stuhr, 2004; Darts, 2004), being able to cognitively process contemporary popular culture and 
“recognize and cite images of Identity manipulation, Gender and Race prejudice, Seduction of 
several kinds and the use and abuse of Power” (Mattson, 2005, p. 85). However, there is also a 
rhetorical vein in the discourse of visual culture education that concerns itself with re-
sensitization and the cultivation of affective sensitivity in the face of ubiquitous, overwhelming, 
often banal or stereotyped expressive forms prevalent in popular visual culture. “The result of 
this often painful sensory bombardment,” wrote Bersson (1982) 
is a flight from the feelings and an embrace of the intellect. The hypertrophy of the 
intellect which results makes its presence felt in our most prominent models of aesthetic 
education and contributes, often against best intentions, to a deadening of our sensory 
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faculties. What is needed, Sontag argues, is not more analysis and interpretation, but 
‘more seeing, more hearing, more feeling.’ The task of the art critic and aesthetic 
educator must be no less than ‘the recovery of the senses’[Sontag, 1967,  p. 14] 
(Bersson, 1982, p. 36). 
Mark Mattson (2005) similarly expressed a need for visual culture education in a time when “It 
seems our culture is running at near the speed of light, too fast to pass judgment. Moral or 
aesthetic” (p. 80). Mattson warned against “becoming jaded” (p. 82) to the power of images due 
to an overabundance of stimuli, a condition of habituated perception I liken to perceptual 
rigidity. 
 Arthur and Joan Kleinman (1996), argued that the widespread political and commercial 
appropriation of images of suffering in contemporary visual culture has resulted in an 
“exhaustion of empathy” (p. 9), desensitizing the public to the very emotions the images are 
meant to elicit. This exhaustion is also characterized as compassion fatigue (Moeller, 1999), 
psychic numbing (Lifton, 1995), moral habituation (Zelizer, 2000), and states of denial (Cohen, 
2001) by cultural critics who “tend to diagnose the precariousness of compassion as a recent 
dimension of a social order in which exposure to narratives and images of suffering has 
paradoxically generated new and dramatic forms of emotional distance” (Dean, 2003, p. 90). The 
exhaustion of empathy is also a phenomenon noticed, on an individual scale, in children who 
endure an overwhelming amount of empathic distress. Hoffman (1975) noted that in a situation 
where the child is empathizing with another’s distress, “beyond a certain point empathic distress 
may become so aversive that one’s attention is directed to the self, not the victim” (p. 963). 
Zahn-Waxler et al. (1990) noted that young children of depressed caregivers could experience 
too much empathy, and too many feelings of responsibility and helplessness, eventually 
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becoming habituated to such a state as a defense mechanism. Vreeke (2003), in describing an 
account from her study, illustrated an example of “negative control” (p. 196) wherein a 22-
month-old child was alarmed by a cry of pain from her mother, and, “overwhelmed by the sight 
of so much pain…slowly back[ed] up, and fumble[d] her sweater” (p. 196), retreating from the 
emotion-provoking stimulus and trying to focus on a distracting manual activity. 
 While there is an emphasis on such habituation developing in the face of a surfeit of 
media images of trauma, I would argue that this kind of numbness can be inculcated for all 
varieties of affective experience. For instance, an overwhelming abundance of clichéd media 
depictions of joy may preclude sensitivity toward, and empathy with, less prescriptive (and 
perhaps more authentic) expressions of joy encountered in art and life. 
 Visual culture art education can help facilitate affective empathy by “sensitiz[ing] the 
perceptions of our students” (Mattson, 2005, p. 87) and combatting habituated modes of 
perceiving and feeling-into visual culture. Shklovsky (1917/1998) contended that art combats 
habituated perception, allowing the subject to “defamiliarize” (p. 18) the familiar. In addition to 
“awaken[ing] students to the complex forces behind the imagery and aesthetics of the familiar” 
(Darts, 2004, p. 316) on a critical and cognitive level, this defamiliarization can also sensitize 
students to both idiosyncrasy and artificiality in mediated affect, rather than leaving them to 
passively recognize (in the Deweyan sense) mediated affect. A visual culture education that 
acknowledges the affective dimension of the aesthetic experience of culture as well as the 
cognitive, critical dimension can mitigate perceptual rigidity and encourage the supple affective 
sensitivity that is prerequisite to the affective dimension of the experience of empathy.  
 While I was unable to find exemplars in the literature for early childhood projects that 
employ defamiliarization to sensitize students to artificiality in mediated affect, I can suggest an 
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outline for such an exploration. Students could draw from a bag containing images of pop-
culture products they are familiar with – toys, clothes, assorted food or drink items – extracted 
from print or video advertisements for those products
24
. The images of the products would be cut 
out, separated from the context of the ad. Students could then create an image of themselves 
using (or discarding, or reacting to) the object, perhaps including the selected object-image as a 
collage element. Students would write a sentence or two describing what they feel when using 
the object, using modifiers such as very, a little, etc. to articulate their emotions to a finer degree. 
Afterward, students could look at the original advertisement, and the object in that context, and 
the student, or the class, could talk about the difference between the student’s stated affective 
response to the item, and the emotional reaction of the figures in the advertisement to the item. 
Such an activity could make salient the disparity between students’ experience of material 
culture and the way that experience is portrayed in advertising, perhaps helping them not to 
simply recognize (and identify with) the prescriptive emotional states of figures in 
advertisements, but to perceive the disparity between their own emotional response and the 
defamiliarized visual culture depiction of the appropriate response. 
 While not as overtly affective or emotional, I have led activities with students that 
encourage defamiliarization toward common elements of material culture in a way that may 
engage cognitive empathy through imaginative projection. In an integrated unit connecting 
imaginative artmaking to speculative science, I would present an object from my past that I felt 
the students may not be familiar with (an old 5.25” floppy disk, an unusual old hand-crank 
cheese grater with tripod legs, etc.) as an alien artifact, for which the students would have to 
hypothesize uses. Eventually, the object’s intended use would be revealed, and we would discuss 
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 Possibly, the students could choose their pop culture object, but that would likely lead to students working with a 
favorite object, which might result in a more exaggerated, self-conscious, affective/emotional response. 
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how an object that was a familiar, everyday object to me, could be completely alien to someone 
else. The students were then challenged to think of an everyday object from their life, and 
imagine they had left it behind on an expedition to an alien planet (earlier in the unit, each 
student had conceived of an alien world and its inhabitants), then create an image of what that 
planet’s inhabitant, ignorant of the “true” use of the object, might use it for after coming across 
it. This required students to imaginatively place themselves in the perspective of a subject with a 
knowledge set very different from their own, and required them to defamiliarize themselves from 
their prior experiences with the object. This is a fairly high level of abstract thought – I did this 
activity with elementary students, not kindergarteners – but it is possible that some younger 
students could be scaffolded toward such a project. 
Confronting Ambiguous Imagery 
 As discussed in chapter 3, Merleau-Ponty (2001/2010) contended that the seemingly 
natural planimetric perspective present in much Western representational art only appears natural 
due to a rigid perceptual bias endemic to a specific culture. “A painting is the manifest trace of a 
certain cultural relationship to the world” (p. 438). In illustrating this point, he invoked other 
traditions of representation such as Greek and Medieval painting which had different strategies 
for organizing space (Merleau-Ponty, 2001/2010), and, perhaps more relevant to discussing art 
education for young learners, pointed out how young children, who have not yet been inculcated 
with a rigid perceptual affinity for Renaissance perspective, are “much more apt to understand 
this drawing or that painting by Picasso than the adults around them...[they] recogniz[e] with 
great freedom in a number of traits what the painter meant to show” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 
150). 
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 Speaking from an art education perspective, Mattson (2005) problematized the allure that 
one-point-perspective’s semblance of unambiguous and ordered space presents to students of art: 
It hypnotizes students new to perspective. Every rail and tie, streetlight and stripe on the 
road, every single building, tree, cloud, and bird turn and march with total devotion to 
that nexus of oblivion. The drawings are boring. There is no individuality, no quirk of 
thought, no life (p. 88). 
Per Mattson, a too-rigid adherence to a seemingly unambiguous, realistic
25
 strategy of perception 
ultimately weakens students’ artwork and affective sensitivity, determining that “[t]heory driving 
the vision rather than informing it can be clumsy and overpower perception” (p. 88). Gude 
(2012) when presenting her “Portrait of a Place” project with Spiral Workshop, in which students 
recreated through collage a space from a vivid memory, advocated the use of non-traditional 
modes of perspective to better represent the ambiguous and subjective spaces in memories, and, 
invoking Sturken and Cartwright’s Practices of Looking (2009), cautioned against modes of 
representation that encourage students to form a rigid subject position. Meyer, Blackburn, and 
Innocenti (2012), also working with the Spiral Workshop, recommended against one-point 
perspective in their “School of Anxiety: Gothic Narrative” project in favor of less prescriptive 
articulations of experience. While these projects were both conducted with secondary students, 
Merleau-Ponty (1964) indicated that similar concerns may be relevant to younger learners whose 
“processes of expression could not be understood as simple breakdowns on the road to ‘visual 
realism’” and who exhibit “a relation with things and with the sensible very different from the 
one that is expressed in the perspective projection of drawing in the classic style” (p. 98). While, 
cognitively, very young students are typically not yet equipped to imaginatively produce images 
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 Meyer, Blackburn, and Innocenti (2012), describing their “School of Anxiety: Gothic Narrative” project for the 
Spiral Workshop, pointedly mentioned how in the project, students were “[f]ree from the narrowing constraints of 
‘realism’ (remember what gets left out in mono-perspective is also ‘real’)” (para 9).” 
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using deliberate perspective strategies, their affective receptivity to varied modes of 
representation (Merleau-Ponty, 2001/2010) indicates that aesthetic encounters with different 
strategies for representing perception in art may discourage the formation later in life of a rigid 
perceptual/aesthetic hierarchy prioritizing a culturally-determined strategy for representing 
reality, as described above by Mattson (2005). 
 A student who is resistant to ambiguity in perceptual experience is more likely to exhibit 
the perceptual and psychological rigidities (Merleau-Ponty, 1964) that can inhibit affective 
empathetic sensitivity (recall the children in Frenkel-Brunswik’s (1949) study who were 
reluctant to see the gradual change of image from cat to dog, and who were likely to score high 
on measures of rigidity and ambivalence). Fortunately, as Merleau-Ponty (2001/2010) touched 
upon above, modern and contemporary artistic practice provides students with a variety of 
ambiguous modes of representation to experience, and young students, less likely to be 
enculturated with ambivalence or rigidity toward unconventional modes of representation, may 
be especially receptive to such work. Likewise, as evidenced by the Spiral Workshop projects 
mentioned above, creative production in an art education environment can provide opportunities 
for students to explore ambiguous modes of representation, and exercise the supple affect 
conducive to affective empathy.  
 Feshbach et al. (1983) also include some activities in their Learning to Care curriculum 
that may be relevant or adaptable to the art classroom. One activity uses common ambiguous 
“optical illusion” images, such as a Rubin vase, a duck/rabbit, and a young/old woman. The 
students are divided into two groups, one of which is told it will be shown, e.g. a picture of a 
vase, while the other is told it will be shown a different picture, e.g. of two faces. The class then 
regroups, and is shown the image again, the ensuing discussion exploring how both groups saw 
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the same image, but saw different things in it, and how one’s peers can have a different 
perspective. Other, similar, images are then discussed. This exercise could be extended to 
include works such as Surrealist paintings that embraced a similar overt ambiguity, but also 
works that are ambiguous in other ways, such as a Close portrait, which only resolves at a 
distance, or a Louise Bourgeois sculpture with indeterminate biomorphic forms. Such works 
engage with visual ambiguity with intent beyond producing an “optical illusion” and may prompt 
discussion on the aesthetic impact or artistic intent behind their strategies of representation, as 
well as the merits of affording different “correct” interpretations. 
 There are myriad ways that art education may refine perception and encourage the 
sensitivity of affect that affords affective empathy. Such strategies range from overt engagements 
with students’ lived emotional experiences and felt responses to works of art to less direct 
investigations which erode general perceptual rigidity through encounters with ambiguity. In 
addition to the affective dimension, art education may also encourage empathy’s cognitive 
component by cultivating forms of imaginative cognition. 
Imagination and Cognitive Empathy in Art Education 
 Maxine Greene (1995), who asserted the link between empathy and imagination, also 
argued that education in the arts could foster such imaginative cognition, claiming that “we must 
acknowledge that imagination and the emotions, including taste and sensibility, can be, and 
ought to be, educated…a powerful way of educating them is through initiation into the artistic-
aesthetic domains” (p. 140). Rather than a second-order recollection or reconstruction of prior 
perceptions, the imagination is an active, constructive conduct which operates “beneath the 
relation of the knowing subject to the known object” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 98), bridging the 
gap between the two. Actively imagining a situation can elicit an inner kinesthetic simulation in 
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the same way that perceiving one does (Gallese, 2003a), which could mean that imaginative 
production in the art classroom can help cultivate empathetic experiences in the way exposure to 
a variety of affective states through works of art can. The imagination is a primary means of 
organizing and understanding experience which can “do away with habitual separations of the 
subjective from the objective, the inside from the outside, [and] appearances from reality” 
(Greene, 1995, p. 140). 
 The cognitive dimension of empathy, which I relate specifically to imaginative cognition, 
is more closely linked to the child’s developmental stages and is more receptive to conventional, 
cognitively-tuned, modes of socialization and instruction (Hoffman, 2000), which may make it 
particularly worthy of consideration when determining how art education may educate students 
toward more empathetic experiences of art and of others. It is particularly relevant to art 
education if, as Efland (2004) asserted, “[i]t is only in the arts where the imagination is 
encountered and explored in full consciousness – where it becomes the object of inquiry” (p. 
769). 
Imaginative Cognition, Metaphor, and Cognitive Empathy in Art Education 
 Arthur Efland (2004) linked art education’s cultivation of imaginative cognition with its 
capacity for conceiving new metaphors and consequently new ways of framing and articulating 
experience. The model of metaphor he used is that of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), wherein 
metaphor is a mapping of an affective source domain onto a conceptual target domain
26
. This 
conception of metaphor within art education is relevant to this study’s discussion of empathy for 
                                                 
26
 A linguistic example of this would be how the metaphor GOOD IS UP yields phrases such as “things are looking 
up” or “high quality” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 16). In this metaphor, the embodied experience of spatial 
orientation (UP) is mapped onto an immaterial concept (GOOD) and entails a corresponding BAD IS DOWN 
metaphor wherein one might say “things are going downhill,” etc. As discussed in chapter 3, however, it is 
important to stress that metaphors are not simply turns of phrase but are more fundamental cognitive constructs used 
to organize experience of the world. 
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two reasons. First, the cognitive phase of the experience of empathy, in which the bodily affect 
response to the other’s condition is cognitively mapped back onto the image or idea of the other, 
might be seen as a parallel function to – or even a subset of – metaphoric cognition, wherein a 
bodily affective experience is cognitively mapped into an abstract conceptual domain. Perhaps 
encouraging students to make metaphoric “cross-domain mappings” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 
58) through artistic practice will also facilitate the type of mapping that plays a part in cognitive 
empathy. 
 The second reason why Efland’s (2004) discussion of Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) 
model of metaphor in the context of art education is related to this study’s exploration of 
empathy is that Efland’s (2004) description of the creation of new metaphors – an imaginative 
task he argued art education is especially well-suited for – indicates that doing so may combat 
psychological rigidity. Per Lakoff and Johnson (1980), metaphors are the mechanisms by which 
we structure our thought. Efland (2004) illustrated how metaphoric structures are pervasive in 
human language and cognition, beyond traditionally poetic or artistic disciplines, by illustrating 
how scientific language makes use of metaphors such as THEORIES ARE BUILDINGS (e.g. 
“Your theory has a solid foundation,” or “You’ll never construct a sound theory upon those 
assumptions alone.”). He posited that while most disciplines use their metaphors uncritically – 
often not recognizing the metaphoric underpinnings of their jargon – it is only in the arts where 
such metaphors, the products of imagination, are scrutinized as “the object of inquiry” (p. 769) 
and constructed anew. Per Efland, the arts classroom is especially well-suited to students 
engaging meaningfully with established metaphoric ways of structuring and interpreting 
experiences, and then constructing new metaphors and new ways of structuring experience. This 
ability to dismiss or reshape established, rigid ways of thinking may facilitate the kind of 
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cognitive suppleness that allows for a more thoughtful, imaginative, cognitive empathetic 
projection. 
Place-Taking via Image-Making 
 It was imagination’s capacity for role-taking that Dewey cited when he commented that 
“[i]magination is the chief instrument of the good. It is more or less a commonplace to say that a 
person’s ideas and treatment of his fellows are dependent upon his power to put himself 
imaginatively in their place” (p. 348). Role-playing activities were identified by Feshbach (1975) 
as one of the most effective strategies for the instruction of empathy, and such activities 
comprise a significant portion of Feshbach et al.’s (1983) Learning to Care curriculum. Strayer 
and Roberts’s (1989) study likewise found a positive correlation between role-taking and 
capacity for empathy in young children. Hoffman (1979b) noted that “role-taking 
opportunities…help sharpen the child’s cognitive sense of the other and thus extend their 
empathic ability” (p. 13), also noting how imaginative role-taking in pretend play can vicariously 
provide emotional experiences beyond the child’s everyday lived experiences, affording, for 
instance, a child who has little experience responding to others’ distress an opportunity to 
“increase their empathic range” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 290). 
 This correlation between imaginative role-taking and the development of cognitive 
empathy assumes a greater significance in the light of accounts suggesting that the creation of 
images may function as a form of imaginative play. If conceiving images can activate the same 
interior motor simulation as seeing them (Gallese, 2003a), might creating images also spur an 
interior affective response? In the last chapter, I discussed Wilson’s (1976) recounting of the 
childhood artmaking experiences of author Julian Green, wherein “he became what he drew” (p. 
52), an anecdote which evokes Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) treatment of the image which, even after 
 90 
 
the mirror stage, remains “mysteriously inhabited by me; it is something of myself” (p. 132). 
Annette Swann (2009), and Anne Haas Dyson (1990), both writing from the perspective of early 
childhood education, relate accounts of children’s artmaking functioning like dramatic play, with 
a bit more detail than Wilson/Green’s account. 
 Swann (2009) noted that “[w]hile art is considered a ‘constructive’ activity, with part-to-
part relationships and separate from pretend play…children’s skill in collaborative play and 
narrative emerges alongside their drawing abilities” through “the imaginative verbal interaction 
between children and their drawings, their peers, and any available audience” (p. 231). She 
recounted a year-long engagement between an arts specialist and a constructivist preschool 
classroom wherein the students engaged in a long-term collaborative play and drawing activity. 
Starting with a discussion of cars and the role they play in the students’ lives, the project 
continued with students drawing roadways on butcher-paper, which they used in play with toy 
cars. An ongoing interaction between artmaking and dramatic play occurred, as the image was 
elaborated with drawings of buildings where play scenarios were set, and students verbally 
related the scenarios they were developing. The students’ play incorporated drawn figures as 
well as classroom toys such as dolls and animals, with both images and objects contributing to 
the shared dramatic play scenarios. While Swann’s account does not explicitly discuss instances 
of role-play, this project does help demonstrate how image-making may function alongside – or 
as a form of – dramatic play. 
 Dyson’s (1990) accounts of drawing-as-dramatic-play from a kindergarten classroom 
feature more explicit instances of role-taking. Dyson noted that “[d]rawing combined with talk 
can quite literally become a canvas for children’s shared dramas…the dialogue between children 
and their papers can include other people as children’s skill as collaborative story tellers and 
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players infuses their drawing” (p. 54). She then recounts a drawing/play session between two 
students named Nate and Chiel, which began with Nate drawing a figure jumping head-first off 
of a diving board and telling Chiel that there was no water in the pool. Chiel’s response was to 
feel above his head and exclaim “Oh! I have no head,” with Nate responding “WHAT?! I have 
no head! HELP ME!” (p. 54). Both students were invested in, and to extent acting out, the state 
of the figure in the image. The students continued to elaborate on the scenario, negotiating 
between the real and imagined world, and negotiating between each other as they seized and 
ceded control of the imagined situation. Ultimately, the content of the drama was spread between 
the image, the verbal exchange of the boys, and a text summary Nate dictated to his teacher 
afterward. “Although Nate and Chiel view[ed] themselves as drawing, they are engaged in the 
complex negotiations described by many observers of children’s dramatic play” (p. 55). The 
students’ artmaking functioned as a vehicle for role-taking and dramatic play, scaffolding it in a 
way similar to the way props, costumes, or toys might. If artmaking can incite the same kind of 
imaginative role-taking as dramatic play, perhaps the types of artmaking which function that way 
may engender empathy the way Hoffman (2000), Feshbach (1975), and Strayer and Roberts 
(1989) suggested role-play can. 
 Feshbach et al. (1983) described a number of activities, which encourage different types 
of perspective and role-taking. One activity, called “Short and Tall” (p. 11), asks students to 
participate at a variety of centers (e.g. looking at mirrors and framed pictures hung at different 
heights, watering a plant on a high shelf etc.), sometimes while walking on their knees, and 
sometimes while wearing platform stilts, and discuss how the experiences were different from 
different points of view. An arts-based extension which might encourage more literal 
perspective-taking would be to ask students to take photographs of the classroom from different 
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perspectives – how a mouse would see the room, how a fifth-grader would see the room, how a 
kindergartener would see the room. This would require students to, through the viewfinder, 
literally adopt the perspectives of different entities of different sizes. The activity could be 
followed up by students later identifying or categorizing the photos by perspective and 
discussion of how they identified each, and describe how seeing the room in these different ways 
feels. Does seeing the room from some perspectives make students feel more powerful or 
capable? More intimidated? Looking at the “mouse perspective” photos, what actions might be 
more challenging, or more easy, for the mouse than for the students?  What might be more 
challenging/easy for the teacher than for the students? The images produced in the project, and 
the ensuing discussion, would scaffold place-taking and allow students to approach a familiar 
space from an unfamiliar perspective – a perspective held by other potential visitors to the 
classroom. 
 Feshbach et al. (1983) also described a perspective-taking activity called “Step-by-Step 
Perspective” (pp. 24-25), which is aimed at older students, and consists of two phases. In one 
phase, students sit in a circle around a table, and objects are placed one by one on it, which they 
draw to the best of their ability. After each object is drawn, the students’ drawings are compared 
and the differences in perspective – the placement and overlapping of the objects – are 
contrasted. The second phase is a essentially a variant on Piaget’s “3 mountain” egocentrism test, 
where students sit on either side of a table with a still life, and try to draw the objects in the way 
their partner across the table sees them. An adaptation of this project for a kindergarten class 
might see students creating a “visual inventory” of the items they can see on a table which has a 
large, obstructing object in the middle, drawing the objects that are in their view, but without 
having to place them in space. The student’s inventories could be compared and contrasted to see 
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what items were missing from each perspective. The second phase, requiring more overt 
perspective-taking, would see paired students on either side of the table charged with creating 
their partner’s inventory. To ensure success (and mitigate the pitfalls of an art exercise which has 
a “correct” answer), students could communicate verbally with their partner or walk around to 
their partner’s side of the table. 
 Caselman (2007) described an activity called “What Would it Be Like” (p. 44) where 
students are asked to imagine the feelings of a goldfish, a flower, a hospital, and a pair of pants. 
The wide variety of objects selected suggests that a similar broad selection of art objects could be 
subject to such a discussion – What would it be like to be one of Matisse’s goldfish? What would 
it be like to be a Beverly Pepper sculpture? This type of inquiry could invoke imaginative place-
taking in the student’s emotional engagement with the artwork in a way that pat questions such 
as “How does this make you feel?” may not. While this discussion activity doesn’t immediately 
and obviously suggest an artmaking extension, an art activity could be planned around the same 
sort of place-taking. Perhaps after a discussion of Impressionism and Expressionism, students 
could create an expressionist painting of an impressionist painting, imagining what the inner 
feelings of the immediately, naturalistically rendered impressionist figure are, and (re-)depicting 
that figure’s inner affect using the gesture and color of expressionism. 
Narrative as a Scaffold for More Complex Cognitive Empathy 
 The majority of examples of role-playing and place-taking through art described above 
have a narrative element to them. Per Johnson (1993), narrative enables one to explore the 
consequences of decisions and commitments over time, using fiction as a laboratory to explore 
both the character and sentiments of other people, as well as the different ways one’s actions 
might affect others. Narratives mirror lived experience in their structure in a way nonfiction does 
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not, and consequently allows imaginary social situations to play out in a way that is more 
concrete than abstract. “The power of fictional narrative to develop our moral sensitivity, our 
ability to make subtle discriminations, and our empathy for others, is thus the result of the 
narrative structure of our lives” (Johnson, 1993, p. 197). 
 The ability of narrative structure to express a situation over time may make the narrative 
aspects of some artforms particularly useful as a scaffold in the empathetic development of 
kindergarten students. In Hoffman’s (2000) developmental model of empathy, five and six-year-
olds are transitioning from the onset of veridical empathy at age three (when children are first 
able to both locate the source of their empathetic distress in the other, and recognize that the 
other’s feelings are independent of their own) toward more complex forms of cognitive empathy 
in at ages six, seven, and beyond, which acknowledge “self and other as continuous persons with 
separate histories and identities” (Hoffman, 1979b, p. 8). This cognitive stage is when children 
can frame their experience of empathy outside of the other’s immediate situation, and recognize, 
for instance, that an other’s distress is part of a chronic pattern, eliciting greater empathy, or that 
an other’s joy is the result of their benefitting from an inequitable situation, limiting empathy 
with that joy. Perhaps narrative artforms, where actions and emotions are placed in the context of 
a situation that changes over time, could help kindergarten students frame their empathetic 
experience of the other’s condition in a broader temporal (and narrative) context. 
 Hoffman (1973) described an activity used with 3-8-year-old children in a 1971 study by 
Helene Borke that measured children’s empathetic response to a narrative. Borke read the 
children stories in which the main character might be perceived as happy, sad, afraid, or angry, 
and then gave the students blank faces to fill in with the appropriate expression. While this 
activity, conceived as an assessment of children’s empathetic ability, is rather prescriptive, the 
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fundamental conceit of an artistic response to an empathy-inducing narrative could be fruitful. 
Hoffman (2000) also described a narrative activity which he conducted in a study of his own. 
The children were read a story in which a child cheats and wins a swimming race by swimming 
only partway and back, but upon his return wins the prize and is congratulated by his classmates. 
The children, older elementary students, were asked to complete the story, including the 
protagonist’s emotions and what happened next. Some subjects were asked to complete the story, 
including the protagonist’s emotions or anyone else’s and what happened next, and individuals 
in this group were more likely to acknowledge the emotions of the unmentioned “real” 
winner/victim. An adaptation of such an activity for an early childhood art environment could 
involve reading the students an illustrated, truncated story with an unresolved emotional or 
ethical quandary, and then prompting the students to complete the story with text and images, 
perhaps in a comic-style sequential narrative. Feshbach et al. (1983) described a similar set of 
activities called “Problem Stories” (p. 20), where students act out multiple conclusions to an 
unfinished story using puppets they have made themselves. 
Place-Taking and Consideration of the Audience in Artmaking 
 Laurel H. Campbell and Deana McDonagh (2009), coming from an art education and 
industrial design background respectively, collaborated on a course of study for undergraduate 
industrial design students that was premised upon cultivating empathy to facilitate more 
thoughtful design of products for use by diverse or underrepresented populations. Their intent 
was to convey to students that 
[n]avigating through this material landscape can become a significant challenge to 
individuals as they age, or if they live with physical disabilities. Students were 
encouraged, through this project, to find meaning in their existing and created material 
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landscapes to express personal meaning to others and to develop empathy, compassion, 
and shared understanding (Campbell & McDonagh, 2009, p. 593). 
After experiencing a museum exhibit of traditional Hispanic altars/shrines, wherein it was 
emphasized that “[e]mpathy was key for understanding why the displays, and their arrangement 
in a particular context, were so important to their creators” (p. 597), students created their own 
personal shrines, as shadowboxes featuring elements of their personal material landscape. 
Reflecting on the activity, Campbell and McDonagh realized that, to better achieve the stated 
aims of the course, the project should have involved making a shrine about/for another person, 
perhaps someone from a statistically underrepresented or marginalized group, which “would 
involve communication between the student and another person to discover what is of value to 
that person” (p. 604). 
 Even outside of design practice, where the objects being made are intended for practical 
use by a recipient, the act of artmaking often must acknowledge the audience who will 
eventually be receiving the work of art. Martin Buber (1947/1965) remarked that “all art is from 
its origin essentially of the nature of dialogue. All music calls to an ear not the musician’s own, 
all sculpture to an eye not the sculptor’s, architecture in addition calls to the step as it walks in 
the building” (p. 25). In addition to providing opportunities for students to imaginatively take the 
place of figures represented in works of art, or peers experiencing the world from different 
perspectives, artmaking provides the opportunity for students to put themselves imaginatively in 
the place of the audience eventually experiencing the work. 
 As with the above discussion of narrative artwork and empathy, empathizing with the 
eventual audience/recipient of a work may be particularly well-suited to the transitional 
developmental stage at which kindergarten students find themselves. As they are progressing 
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toward a more complex form of cognitive empathy which accounts for experience beyond the 
immediate situation (Hoffman, 2000), the exercise of putting themselves in the place of another 
person experiencing the finished work at another time may be an appropriate task. 
 Such tasks could involve making artwork for a specific person. Caselman (2007) 
described a project in which students are read a brief story “that evokes a variety of feelings” (p. 
44) (Caselman suggests The Ugly Duckling as an example) and then asked to write a letter to the 
character expressing their empathy with the character’s situation. Rather than writing a letter, 
perhaps students could create a meaningful object that they feel the character would want in its 
situation, or illustrate a card containing their message to the character. Perhaps the narrative 
could be art-historical, a biography of an artist who has lived a challenging life, such as Vincent 
Van Gogh, Friedl Dicker-Brandeis, or Hollis Sigler. 
 Other strategies for encouraging students to be mindful of their eventual audience could 
include involving them in the planning and hanging of an exhibition of their work, or having 
students create a piece of artwork for someone in their life. 
Conclusion 
 Art education, by providing students a space for sensitive aesthetic attention to art 
objects, people, and their environment, as well as a space for imaginative (re-)construction of 
bodily and emotional states, can afford young students experiences that may cultivate both 
affective and cognitive dimensions of empathy. Beyond artmaking that encourages personal 
expression or emotional literacy, the art classroom can foster empathy in a more fundamental 
way by cultivating supple affect and thought. It can also erode those perceptual and 
psychological rigidities that impede veridical experience of the other’s condition. While this 
chapter has included some provisional suggestions for activities alongside the theoretical threads, 
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a more finalized implementation plan or curriculum lies outside the aims of this study. Such a 
project, however, could be a fruitful direction for future study to take. In the following chapter, I 
will conclude the study by reflecting on the conclusions drawn in the previous chapters, and 
evaluating potential future avenues for continued research. 
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Chapter 5 – Concluding Thoughts 
 Over the course of this study my aim has been to develop a fruitful conception of the 
relationship between the experience of empathy and the practice of art education in early 
childhood. To this end, I developed a workable model of the experience of empathy, drawing 
upon Hoffman’s (2000) developmental model of empathy, with its cognitive and affective 
components, Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) concept of “transitivism” (p. 135) in early childhood and 
his discussion of the young child’s increasing awareness that their vicarious empathetic 
experience is located in the other, and Gallese’s (2003a) discussion of the “shared manifold” (p. 
525) between subjects, bolstered by kinesthetic mirror neurons. The resulting model featured an 
affective dimension, which is an involuntary bodily response to the other’s condition, and which 
exists from infancy, and a cognitive dimension, which develops over time, and becomes 
increasingly capable of projecting that vicarious felt experience onto the understood situation of 
the other. 
 Relating this conception of the experience of empathy to the experience of making and 
observing artworks drew upon Dewey’s (1934) distinction between aesthetic and artistic 
experience, the former being characterized by sensitive perception and the latter by imaginative 
production. I connected this twofold conception of the experience of art (which Dewey lamented 
the lack of a single, synthesizing term to describe) to the twofold model of empathy employed in 
the study – the sensitive unmediated perception of the aesthetic operating similarly to the 
affective dimension, and the imaginative cognition of the artistic bearing similarity to the 
cognitive dimension of empathy. I further articulated this connection by discussing Frenkel-
Brunswik’s (1949) experimental examination of the connection between psychological and 
perceptual rigidity. I showed that passive, rigid perception (what Dewey (1934) would describe 
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aesthetically as “mere recognition” (p. 53)) correlates with rigid conceptions of other people, and 
I suggested that perceptual rigidity may impede affective empathy and that psychological rigidity 
may likewise impede cognitive empathy. 
 The exploration of this concept of rigidity provided a space for discussing how art 
education in early childhood may encourage empathy by mitigating rigidities. Greene’s (1995) 
contention that art education stimulates perception and imagination indicated that art experiences 
in school could address both perceptual and psychological rigidity and encourage both the 
affective and cognitive dimensions of empathy. General education curricula by Feshbach et al. 
(1983) and Caselman (2007), as well as work by art educators such as Jeffers (2009a, 2009b, 
2010) and Gude (2012) provide some exemplars of how art experiences in early childhood could 
cultivate both the sensitive affect that encourages students to be aware of others’ experiences and 
the imaginative cognition that allows them to fully contextualize that vicariously felt experience 
in a more complex, possibly more veridical, way. 
 This theoretical exploration could provide a platform for various avenues of future 
research, and some findings may have more immediate use in art education practice. 
Findings 
 The dual conception of empathy, as an experience with both an affective and cognitive 
component afford a theoretical space in which both affective sensitivity and imaginative 
cognition each contribute, in their own way, to the child’s developing experience of others. This 
twofold model may be a useful conceptual tool for art teachers who see in their practice a need 
for increased emotional literacy and awareness in their students,
27
 but who don’t want to cede the 
conceptual and cognitive dimensions of their subject in favor of a purely creative-self-expression 
                                                 
27
 Such as early childhood educators described by Whitted (2010), Rimm-Kaufman, Pianta, and Cox (2000),  and 
Arnold, McWilliams,& Arnold (1998), who cite “lack [of] some or all of the needed social and emotional 
competencies necessary for school success” (Whitted, 2010,  p. 10) as a significant challenge. 
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approach. Developing higher-order cognition, such as forms of perspective-taking or abstraction 
of thoughts outside of the immediate situation, in artmaking can encourage modes of thinking 
that are useful for the higher-order modes of cognitive empathy that kindergarten-aged students 
are working toward (Hoffman, 2000). These art experiences, even without an explicit socio-
emotional component, could function as a source domain for analogy and metaphor in 
discussions of empathy and interpersonal relation. 
 Just as the dual nature of empathy in this model can give instructors ways to foster 
empathy beyond exploring traditionally emotional and expressive artforms, the link between 
perceptual and psychological rigidity, and their mutual tamping-down of empathy, can give 
teachers an avenue to create space for empathetic experience by using art to thoughtfully 
question or dismantle habituated thinking. For instance, visual culture approaches to art 
education, can affectively sensitize students to sensations rendered banal by pop-cultural 
ubiquity, and cognitively critique the way pop-culture shapes the way we relate with and 
categorize other people. Modern and contemporary artforms, which often exhibit formal and/or 
conceptual ambiguity, can likewise be explored in the art classroom, capitalizing on that 
ambiguity to erode the rigid perceptions and conceptions that may hinder empathy, without 
necessarily explicitly addressing it. By defying students’ habituated perception and conventional 
categories of thought, by challenging students to engage with unconventional, and often unclear, 
new affective experiences, and by challenging students to formulate new categories, connections 
and metaphors, contemporary arts engagement can foster the supple affect and cognition that 
encourage affective and cognitive empathy. The model of empathy explored in this study affords 
space for art education practice to contribute to factors amenable to social feeling and cognition 
without relegating itself to Romantic or shallow “touchy-feely” exercises – or without restricting 
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itself to those thoughtful, effective self-expression exercises which, nonetheless don’t, by 
themselves, engage with the breadth of ideas and practices in contemporary art. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
Practical Application 
 While there are concepts explored in this study which could have relevance in art 
education practice, the theoretical nature of this investigation has produced a largely academic, 
conceptual body of knowledge that has not yet been practically applied, or epistemically 
scrutinized, in the classroom. One probable extension of this research would be the development 
of an early childhood curriculum based on the ideas and principles explored in this study, and the 
experimental testing of this curriculum’s efficacy in an art education classroom. Feshbach et al. 
(1983) produced their Learning to Care general education curriculum as a similar practical 
extension of prior research, developing practices and projects from their earlier experimental 
investigations, and then subjecting that developed practice to its own experimental study in the 
classroom to assess its efficacy and revise it if need be. The hypothetical art education 
curriculum could be an elaboration upon the activities discussed in chapter 4,
28
 and the 
hypothetical experiment could use pre- and post-tests for affective and cognitive empathetic 
experience by assessing children’s verbal and nonverbal responses to stories, pictures, or short 
films (as in experiments described by Hoffman (1973, 2000), Fabes et al. (1990), and Feshbach 
and Roe (1968)). Such tests could be derived from the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Konrath et 
                                                 
28
 In addition to fleshing out and making practicable the lessons generally outlined in this study, a comprehensive 
curriculum for applying this research should attend carefully to the language used by the teacher to discuss affective 
experience, going beyond surface inquiries such as “How does it make you feel?” Research could include extant 
social and emotional learning (SEL) curricula for this age group, which include suggestions for verbal scaffolding 
prompts, and illustrative vignettes of verbal exchanges encouraging or expressing empathy, such as the Strong Start 
Pre-K curriculum evaluated in Gunter, Caldarella, Korth and Young’s (2012) study, or the High Scope SEL 
curriculum (Epstein, 2012). 
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al., 2011) and/or the Basic Empathy Scale (Albiero, P, Matricardi, G., Speltri, D., & Toso, D., 
2009). 
Extending the Theoretical Discussion to Include Prosocial Action 
 While this study has focused on the experience of empathy and its relation to art 
education, using Martin Hoffman’s (1975, 1977, 1979b, 2000) affective/cognitive distinction to 
articulate that experience, Hoffman’s model of empathy also included a third component beyond 
the affective and cognitive: the motivational. Hoffman’s (1977) motivational component is 
concerned with “the relation between empathic distress and prosocial action” (p. 4), and further 
research on the subject of empathy and art education could extend to include an exploration of 
whether and how prosocial action precipitates from empathetic experience
29
, and what role 
aesthetics and artmaking might play in generating these active responses. 
 This theoretical extension could also be a component of the practical/experimental 
extension described above. In addition to measuring students’ affective and cognitive empathy 
through verbal and nonverbal responses to various emotionally-charged stimuli, the pre- and 
post-tests examining the efficacy of a proposed curriculum could assess the students’ tendencies 
towards prosocial behavior before and after the intervention. This data could be collected by 
interview, as in similar studies by Strayer and Roberts (1989), or through observation and 
recording of students’ responses to (constructed or in-class) situations, like the detailed 
observations described by Vreeke (2003). 
Exploration of Specific Practices in Artmaking 
                                                 
29
 Works cited elsewhere in this study that explore the potential causal relationship between empathy and prosocial 
action include Hoffman (1977, 2000),  Strayer and Roberts (1989), Zahn-Waxler and Radke-Yarrow (1990), 
Feshbach (1975), and Vreeke and Van Der Mark (2003). 
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 This study discussed art education generally, but more specific explorations could tease 
out finer connections between specific art practices and the cultivation of the kinds of thought 
and sensitivity conducive to experiences of empathy. 
 New media art education is a personal research interest of mine, and, as most of the 
literature I encountered drew upon traditional media forms (e.g. Merleau-Ponty’s (2001/2010) 
discussion of perspective in drawing and painting, Alvarez’s (2010) encounters with sculptures 
in the museum setting, or the art projects in Feshbach et al.’s(1983) and Caselman’s (2007) 
curricula), extending this inquiry into new media arts practice could address a gap in the 
literature. New media artist David Rokeby (1996) and interaction designer Chris Crawford 
(2003) have both characterized the audience’s participation with interactive artwork in terms of 
dialogue, Crawford going so far as to delineate the essential aesthetic components of interactive 
art metaphorically as listening, speaking, and thinking. Rather than an interaction between a 
person and object, interactive artwork in some ways embodies an asynchronous interaction 
between audience and artist – Crawford (2003) asserted that “[t]he person using your software is 
interacting with you, not the computer” (p. 114). Just as Campbell and McDonagh (2009) noted 
the role of empathy in designing objects to be used by others, perhaps there are empathetic 
ramifications to the kind of mindfulness artists must have when creating work that the audience 
will interact with. 
 In addition to focusing on traditional media, much of the literature I encountered focused 
on figurative imagery, both in the types of eliciting materials used in experiments such as photos 
and filmstrips (e.g. Fabes et al. (1990); Goldstein & Winner, 2012; Hoffman, 2000), and the 
artwork engaged with by students (e.g. Alvarez, 2010; Jeffers, 2010; Robinson, 2007). Non-
objective work, and its potential relation to empathy within art education, was not explicitly 
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discussed in my exploration of the literature. Figurative artwork presents itself as an obvious 
focus for discussions of empathy, as the viewer readily reads emotions from the figures’ postural 
schemata. Worringer (1908/1963), with his dialectic between empathy and abstraction, asserted 
categorically that abstract artwork indicated a movement away from aesthetic empathy. 
However, a closer examination and problematization of these assumptions may be fruitful, 
especially in light of Merleau-Ponty’s (1964) and Frenkel-Brunswik’s (1949) discussions of 
ambiguous imagery and its opposition to perceptual rigidity, and Freedberg and Gallese’s (2007) 
discussion of gestural traces in non-objective artwork eliciting kinesthetic affective responses. 
Conclusion 
 In an increasingly connected, and consequently increasingly diverse, global culture 
(Campbell & McDonagh, 2009; Jeffers, 2009b), encouraging empathy through the supple and 
versatile thinking and feeling found in the arts may facilitate interpersonal understanding and 
shared experience across cultural boundaries that typically impede empathy (Feshbach, 1975; 
Hoffman, 1979c). Beyond the benefit of increased interpersonal understanding, an awareness of 
empathy and how it works may foster other kinds of insight. Per Gallese (2003a), understanding 
one’s relation to the other, and the nature of that relation, not only “capture[s] an essential trait of 
the human mind – its social character – but also, and even more importantly, …provide[s] a 
greater opportunity to understand how the individual mind develops and works” (p. 517). 
Acknowledging that the human mind doesn’t exist or grow in a “solipsistic, monadic” (p. 517) 
way, an understanding of how one person shares another’s experience through empathy may help 
not just in encouraging empathy in students, but in understanding how each individual student 
learns and develops through this faculty. Dewey (1908/1996) remarked that empathy is “the tool, 
par excellence, for resolving a complex situation” (p. 130). Perhaps seeking ways to encourage 
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empathy in students will equip them not only to be more sensitive to the affective states of 
others, but also to grasp, and participate in, more complex social situations with greater acuity. 
 In experimental studies, empathy has also been shown to have a negative correlation with 
aggression and disruptive disorders in students (Feshbach, 1975; Strayer & Roberts, 1989). In 
light of early childhood educators’ reporting of socio-emotional deficits as one of their greatest 
challenges (Whitted, 2010; Rimm-Kaufman, Pianta, and Cox, 2000; Arnold,McWilliams, & 
Arnold, 1998), looking specifically at ways to foster more complex interpersonal awareness in 
this age group, with its particular cognitive and social skillset, could address a pressing need. 
“Ill-equipped with the skills to deal with children’s disruptive, aggressive, oppositional, and 
noncompliant behavior, educators often respond to these children with punitive disciplinary 
measures that further perpetuate the problem” (Whitted, 2010, p. 10). Perhaps providing 
theoretical equipment of increased instruction and awareness of empathy would not only allow 
teachers to better “deal with” the strongly felt emotions of some students, but may help students 
better understand their peers, and their own emotions, and address and reduce the sort of 
aggression that is deleterious to the school and social experience of both teachers and students. 
 These potential points of relevance and application are still in the realm of “may” and 
“perhaps” – it was beyond the focus of this study to address the question of instrumental 
application of this theory and its effects in the classroom. But for art educators whose teaching 
experience, or encounters with other literature in the field, have left them convinced of, or 
interested in, the value of encouraging empathy in students, this theoretical framework could 
serve as a foundation for the development of practice.  
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